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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EUI in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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The Mediterranean Programme was established at the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Autumn 1998. The 
Mediterranean Programme has two long-term strategic objectives. First, to 
provide education and conduct research which combines in-depth knowledge of 
the Middle East and North Africa, of Europe, and of the relationship between 
the Middle East and North Africa and Europe. Second, to promote awareness of 
the fact that the developments of the Mediterranean area and Europe are 
inseparable. The Mediterranean Programme will provide post-doctoral and 
doctoral education and conduct high-level innovative scientific research.
The Mediterranean Programme has received generous financial support for 
Socio-Political Studies from three major institutions who have guaranteed their 
support for four years: ENI S.p.A, Ente Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze, and 
Mediocredito Centrale. The European Investment Bank, Compagnia di San 
Paolo and Monte dei Paschi di Siena have offered generous financial support 
for four years for studies in Political Economy which will be launched in Spring 
2000. In addition, a number of grants and fellowships for nationals of the 
Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries have been made available by the 
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (for doctoral students) and the City of 
Florence (Giorgio La Pira Fellowship for post-doctoral fellows).
For further information:
Mediterranean Programme
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
via dei Roccettini, 9
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI)
Italy





























































































The process of incipient state formation began in this country in 1994 
immediately after the signing of the Oslo Agreement (signed in 1993 between 
the PLO and the state of Israel) started a process of devolution of Israeli control 
over the occupied territories in the West Bank and Gaza. The process of de­
colonisation was protracted and complex. Palestinian society (as we have 
already indicated) had developed a strong fabric of mass organisation, which 
undertook the role of surrogate national institutions in the absence of a state. 
The new authority however was not friendly to these formations (NGOs, mass 
organisations, radical parties, etc..). Instead the new state-in-formation under 
Arafat entered in a series of confrontations with the pre-state groups that were 
at times strained, conflictual and occasionally displacing. Sometimes 
overlapping programs were undertaken (such as with the voluntary health 
associations and the ministry of public health) to mutual benefit. Below we have 
analysed six cases that illustrate and magnify the nature of this new dynamism 
between Palestinian civil society and the emerging national authority on the eve 
of declaration of statehood (to be declared in September 2000):
1. NGOs and State in Palestine: Negotiating Boundaries
2. The Legislative Assembly versus the Government Executive
3. Mobilisation of Camp Refugees and local municipal authorities
4. The Women’s Model Parliament and Reform of Personal Status Law
5. The Government (PNA) versus the Islamic Movement Hamas.



























































































NGOs and State in Palestine: Negotiating Boundaries
A publication of a report by the Office of the United Nations Special 
Coordinator (UNSCO) in the Occupied Territories in May 1999, triggered a 
new confrontation (some commentators used the term war) between the PNA 
government, and Palestinian NGOs1. The confrontation was initiated by the 
minister of justice, using data of funds transferred, since the establishment of 
the PNA, to Palestinian NGOs working in the field of human rights, as the 
rationale for the attack. The report purports to assess “progress in the rule of law 
development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip” presents data available as of the 
end of February 1999. It concludes that “the total amount of donor and agency 
funds thus far committed to the rule of law sector, including completed, 
ongoing, and pending projects, is US$100,725,612”. Of the total committed for 
the support of the sector, “24.8% is in the form of technical assistance, 16.8% as 
financial assistance, 13.7% in training and education, and 5.6% in the form of 
provision of equipment, furniture and material. The remaining 39.1% in the 
form of multiple types of assistance”.
The report points out that “donors commitments to date have been 
allocated to the following: non-govemmental organisations (16.7%): the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (15.0%); law enforcement (14.4%; the judiciary 
(14.0%); electoral system development (10.2%); human rights education and 
public information development (7.5%); and professional and legal education 
(5.1%)”. This shows that a sizeable amount of the assistance mentioned went, 
directly or indirectly, to PNA bodies (including the PLC)2. This fact was 
deliberately ignored in the campaign against the NGOs. It also ignored the 
rationale given by the report for the donors’ interest in developing the 
Palestinian legal system. This is articulated as follows: “overcoming the 
decades of institutional neglect arising from Israeli occupation; rendering some 
consistency to outdated and often conflicting laws; providing comprehensive 
and standardised training (including human rights training) to law enforcement 
officials, legislative staff, members of the judiciary, prosecutors, and others in
'UNSCO, Rule o f Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Gaza, May 1999.
2 It is difficult to disentangle the amount allocated directly to NGOs working in the field of 
human rights during the period surveyed by the UNSCO report, but a rudimentary calculation 
suggests a figure of some US$21million. This does not include assistance allocated the 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights (about US$1.7 million), to Birzeit 
University Institute of Law (about US$5 million), and about US$1.8 million to Women’s 
Affairs Technical Committee. Some US$11.6 million is allocated to the PLC. It is not easy to 
determine assistance allocated indirectly to NGOs working in this sector, and even more 




























































































the legal profession; and creating a physical infrastructure for the legal 
system”3.
Three aspects are of special interest in understanding the dynamics of the 
confrontation. These are:
a. The time dynamics of the confrontation;
b. The ethnography of actors directly involved in the confrontation and 
their various stances;
c. The topography of the outcome of the confrontation that surfaced 
during the summer of 1999.
A. Timing the Confrontation
The timing of confrontation between the government and the NGOs (to use the 
current phraseology rejected by some in this sector, preferring the term “civic 
associations”) is significant. The tension between the government and NGOs 
can be traced to 1995 when the newly established PNA proposed a law (based 
largely on the law applied in Egypt) which would restrict, substantively, the 
autonomy of the NGOs and puts them under the control of the Palestinian 
government. A sector of the NGOs, (Palestinian NGO Network or PNGO 
Network), rejected the proposed law, and waged a campaign that led to its 
shelving. In this campaign PNGO Network4 used its various connections with 
the PNA, and with donors to suspend legislating its version of the law. 
Moreover it proposed an alternative formulation of the law that it thought to be 
more apt to the Palestinian situation. In 1996, following the election of the 
Palestine Legislative it began to canvass for the legislation of a law that meets 
the vision embodied in its formulation. It also involved the Federation of 
Charitable Organisations in the process of formulation and lobbying for a 
modem and liberal conception of a law governing NGOs. It was this 
formulation of the PNGO Network that had the most positive influence on the 
law adopted by the PLC in its third (and final) reading in December 1998. 
However the PLC law could not become law before being approved by the 
president of the PNA. The later returned it, in March 1999, asking the 
amendment of the article specifying the ministry responsible for registering civil 
and charitable institutions to be changed to the Ministry of Interior instead of 
the Ministry of Justice. The PLC rejected the amendment, but in a session that 
did not have the necessary quorum of its members (i.e., a simple majority)
3 Ibid. p. 12.
4PNGO-Palestine Network has 85 organizations affiliated to it, and The Federation of 




























































































according to the legal committee of the Council, so the decision of the Council 
remains unclear concerning this point.
It was at this conjecture that the UNSCO report (May 1999) was 
published. The report was, almost immediately, seized upon, by some in the 
PNA (including minister of justice), to launch an attack on NGOs charging 
them with malpractice, corruption, and executing a foreign agenda aimed at 
discrediting the PNA. The fact that the UNSCO report dealt with foreign 
assistance provided to law development and human rights organisations 
explains why the campaign was particularly vehement against NGOs working in 
the field of human rights. Most of these have been vocal in publicising 
violations of human rights by the PNA security forces. However the campaign 
soon engulfed, other NGOs.
It also transpired that the timing of the confrontation is not unconnected 
to a dispute that flared between the Egyptian government and Egyptian NGOs 
regarding the impending intention of the government to pass a law that restricts 
further the activity and funding of the NGOs. It turned out that some of these 
used, in their objection of the Egyptian government intention, the law passed by 
the PLC as an example of a modem and progressive law that should be 
emulated in Egypt. This did not seem to have been persuasive enough as the 
government’s proposed law was passed by the Egyptian parliament. But it is 
more than likely that this episode had the effect of stiffing attitudes of some in 
the Palestinian government towards its NGOs as the Palestinian government 
maintains good relations with its Egyptian counterpart.
The above narrative argues that the timing of the confrontation between 
the two major contenders (government and the NGOs) was not fortuitous. It was 
some government representatives who initiated the new confrontation. This 
initiation, as the narrative suggests, was informed by a specific set of episodes, 
and guided by a political focus. The episodes, were, to summarize; the dispute 
existing between the PLC and the government on aspects of the law to regulate 
the relationship between the government and the NGOs; the dispute flaring, at 
the time, between the government, and NGOs in Egypt; and, the report by was 
published UNSCO on the foreign assistance granted to law development in 
Palestine. The political focus that guided the presidency remained the bringing 




























































































B. An Ethnography of the Players
The two main contenders in the confrontation, i.e. the government; and the 
NGOs, are conversant with the views and stances of each other. They are also 
aware of the issues involved, and conscious that central issue revolves round 
defining the internal boundary of the emerging state structures in relation to that 
of civil society. They are also cognizant of local, regional an international 
context of the confrontation. The earlier part of the study has viewed the major 
changes that impacted the situation governing CVOs in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, following the Oslo accords and the acknowledgement by the Israel 
and the PLO of each other. As was mentioned the PLO and its constituents 
political groups promoted and supported (financially and organizationally), in 
the 1980s, the formation of Palestinian CVOs. This was propelled by the need, 
in a situation of a national struggle, to establish structures that that can act as 
fronts for political action, in addition to providing services to communities in 
WBGS whose infrastructure and public institutions were strangled by the 
colonial settler state. This was necessary as the PLO and its political 
components where banned and demonized as terrorist by Israel.
The accords ended the PLO commitment to armed struggle and instituted, 
instead, a commitment to negotiations. This allowed open political activity by 
PLO factions that did not practice armed resistance once the PNA was 
established. This meant that the need for CVOs to act as fronts for political 
parties became less insistent. This is not however the only factor for the change 
of perspective towards CVOs. Following the Gulf War, much of the financial 
aid earmarked (mostly by the oil Gulf states) to the PLO was stopped. This 
impaired the Organization’s capacity to provide financial support to existing, 
CVOs in WBGS, or promote the creation of new CVOs. This was replaced by 
foreign funding. But foreign funders, unlike Palestinian political parties, were, 
and are, not interested in strengthening the organizational popular base of the 
CVOs. A base that began to shrink, anyway, as the intifada lost in its 
dynamism, began to disintegrate and became distant from achieving its aims.
Thus PNA appeared at a juncture when Palestinian communities in the 
WBGS were exhausted, and political parties and movements were facing a 
novel milieu, and new force) Hamas) has emerged on the Palestinian political 
field, to challenge the PLO. It was expected that the PNA would view the 
NGOs as part and parcel of the national movement, and expected them to view 
the P(NA as representing the national movement. However NGOs, particularly 
the more dynamic and dynamic sector, the situation differently. They saw the 




























































































society. This was the outlook that urged a group of NGOs to form their own 
network.
The financial independence of a large group of NGOs from the political 
parties, and the shrinking social base of the latter (especially the left-wing 
parties) facilitated a desire among NGOs to take a critical stance towards the 
PNA. Their rationale for insisting on their autonomy, however, tended to stress 
their history of struggle against the occupation, and their record in providing 
services to the Palestinian community. Their discourse emphasized the 
centrality of civil society in the process of democratization, development, and 
the building of a modem state. The fears of NGOs were animated, in 1995, 
when the PNA proposed, in 1995, a constraining law to regulate NGOs. The 
proposed law drew heavily on an Egyptian law, which the NGOs considered as 
meddlesome and too restrictive. A similar law was proposed for political 
parties, but it was found unacceptable and incongruent with the experience of 
the PLO and the complexities of the Palestinian situation, by most political 
parties. Hence it was not presented to the PLC.
The confrontation that flared up, in the summer of 1999 involved other 
actors. Three are of special significance; the PLC, political parties, and the mass 
media (especially the press). The position of the PLC appears as the more 
intriguing. As an institution it was elected, early in 1996, in accordance with the 
Oslo agreement. For various reasons, including the boycott of opposition of the 
election, a large majority was from the party that dominated the PNA (Fateh). 
However, it soon found itself, as an institution, in conflict with the government 
(more specifically with the president of the PNA), and felt that it is being 
marginalised at a moment when it was eager to empower itself as a legislator, 
and as an overseer of the government. This seems to have motivated the zealous 
members of the PLC to assert its independence relying on the legitimacy it 
acquired through democratic elections, and strengthened their commitment to 
democratic practices. Hence their sympathy to the position expressed by NGOs 
on their prospective relation with the government. This explains why the NGOs 
where effective in influencing the PLC in legislating a law more friendly to 
their view than with that of the government. Thus the demand by the president 
of the PNA to amend the law so that the Ministry of Interior replaces the 
Ministry of Justice as the body responsible for the registration of NGOs 
appeared as an attempt to restrict the relative autonomy of the NGOs guaranteed 




























































































The second party to be drawn in the confrontation was political parties. 
As the campaign, waged in the mass media discrediting the NGOs intensified, 
the PNGOs Network approached the political parties for support. They 
succeeded in persuading almost all the active PLO factions (including the mling 
faction) to issue, the 16* of June 1999, a press release in their support5. The 
statement articulated the stance of the signatories as follows6:
1. “National factions and forces were shocked by an orchestrated and 
systematic media campaign against Palestinian non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).
This campaign denies the national role of NGOs against the occupation, 
their support for the steadfastness of the people of Palestine in their 
country, their prevention of the uprooting of the Palestinian people, and 
their determination to make clear the oppressive practices of the Israeli 
occupation forces”.
2. The “campaign is carried out at a time when a large number of NGOs 
are participating with our people and national political forces in the 
developmental and national activities against settlements and the 
judaization of all of the Occupied Territories, especially Jerusalem”
3. Palestinian NGOs “are also participating in recruiting world-wide 
public opinion in support of the Palestinian cause”.
4. Stressed the repeated demand of Palestinian NGOs “for the ratification 
of the law that governs their activities and their relations with the 
Palestinian Authority”. The statement emphasised the fact that the PLC 
has ratified the law on its third reading, yet the law remains without the 
necessary endorsement by the president of the PNA.
5. The law passed by the PLC law “guarantees the commitment of all 
NGOs to the principles of transparency and accountability”. The 
statement emphasised that what is needed now was “to implement the law 
passed by the PLC”, otherwise the NGOs will be dealt with “in an 
arbitrary or subjective way”.
5 The political parties that signed the statement are; l.The Palestinian National Liberation 
Movement -  Fateh; 2. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); 3. The 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP); 4. The Palestinian People’s Party 
(PPP); 5. The Democratic-Building Movement; 6. The Popular Struggle Front. FIDA (another 
PLO faction) issued a separate statement, two days later, emphasising more or less the same 
points, but giving more stress on the need for transparency and accountability of NGOs.




























































































6. The political parties “share the NGOs’ demands to implement the law 
while we also demand the ratification, publication, and implementation of 
all other laws passed by the PLC”. The statement draws attention to the 
fact that “the majority of these laws have not yet been implemented”.
7. The statement emphasised “the importance of the national and 
developmental role of Palestinian NGOs as well as their role in 
promoting democracy in Palestinian society and people’s participation in 
the decision-making process”. It expressed the political parties’ 
insistence “on the right of Palestinian NGOs to work freely in a 
democratic environment adhering to the rule of law.
8. Political groups stressed that they recognise “the democratic and 
national role of this important sector and call for safeguarding the 
independence of NGOs and strengthening internal democracy and 
transparency within these organisations”. Political parties also stated that 
they considered the NGOs “as people’s organisations, serving their 
interests and goals in the struggle for liberation and the building of the 
Palestinian independent state with Jerusalem as its capital”.
It is worth noting that Islamic parties did not sign the statement, nor did they 
issue a public statement on the issue. This is despite the fact that the 
government in recent years closed a number of NGOs supported by Islamic 
radical movement. It is likely that this position of Islamic groups is related to 
the secular and left-wing leanings of a large number of NGOs, including those 
working in the human rights’ and development field. However some articles 
supportive of the NGOs and critical of the government position did appear in 
the local Islamic press7.
7For example, Al-Risala, a weekly journal supportive of the Islamic Salvation Party (very 
near to Hamas), carried articles attacking the campaign aimed at discrediting NGOs, and 
called for: the enacting of the PLC law on NGOs, and for the government to acknowledge the 
autonomy of these institutions, as part of the “living tissue of society”, to enlarge the 
“democratic space”, and to stop its campaign of accusations against Palestinian NGOs whose 
situation is different from that which exists in Egypt. It advocated a relationship between 
NGOs and the government that is based on openness, and trust, instead of “containment, 
hegemony, and confiscation of rights”. (AL-Risalya, 8/7/1999, article by Bassam Aql-Aqra”). 
In an interview (in August 1999) with a West Bank leader from the Islamic Jihad, he though 
that the attack of NGOs aims at increasing central control of PNA, and that corruption in 





























































































Despite the absence of public support of the Islamic movement to NGOs in 
their confrontation with the government, it can be said that they succeeded in 
winning the open support of all other political parties, including the party that 
dominates the government (Fateh). However the latter’s support appears 
somewhat critical, if we look at a pamphlet on the issue directed to their cadre. 
It considers the aim of the campaign against the NGOs to be the discrediting the 
Palestinian national project by shaking the confidence in the PLC that passed a 
law governing the activities of these and their relationship with the government. 
It also aims at stirring conflict and strife between the government and the 
NGOs. The pamphlet acknowledges the important role of “civic institutions” in 
Palestinian society before the establishment of the PNA, and their necessity 
during the interim period (as they can reach areas that are beyond the 
jurisdiction of the PNA). It goes on, then, to suggest that the establishment of 
PNA oblige the NGOs to adopt more complimentary roles to that of the former. 
But it goes on to suggest that the number of NGOs has multiplied, in a 
disordered way, since the establishment of the PNA, because of the absence of 
law, and the multiplicity of sources of funding. It divides doners into two main 
groups; one funds NGOs so as to support the PNA, and requires co-ordination 
with it, others fund organisations working in the field of democracy and human 
rights so as to “magnify the mistakes of the PNA, in way that no authority can 
allow”. It suggest that NGOs work for “normalisation” with Israel (before a 
final settlement is reached), and thus receive financial support from donors 
whose agenda is to encourage normalisation. This it contrast with organisations 
which look “towards building a democratic and autonomous civil society within 
the framework of national sovereignty” where a g civil society completes a 
government of an independent national state8. The Fateh pamphlet concludes by 
enumerating the necessary attributes of ‘civic organisations’ that qualify to be 
part of civil society. These include: implementing the (proposed) law; co­
ordination with the respective ministry; possessing a clear internal constitution 
that defines aims, tasks, membership, structures, and procedures and activities; 
finances specifying publicly the source, and the aims of funders; autonomy 
within the limits of the law; accountability and transparency; possessing an 
effective administration; dependence on voluntary work: and co-ordination with 
bodies working in the same field (ministries, other NGOs, mass organisations, 
etc). Most of these specifications are not more than a reading of the PLC law 
regulating the activities of NGOs. The danger in the Fateh’s (as a ruling party) 
position, however, does not lie in such reading of the PLC law, but in dividing 
NGOs arbitrarily into good and bad, and making the relationship with the 
government, the deciding criteria. The position taken by the ruling party calls
8 Fateh, No.12, the second half of June 1999. Civil society is defined, in the pamphlet as 





























































































for an explanation. As a political party it is anxious to keep a distance for the 
government and its agencies, but without appearing to be side uncritically with 
NGOs. The stance it took does both; supporting the PLC law, and avoid having 
to actively lobby the president of the PNA (who is also the leader of the party) 
to endorse the PLC law.
The stance taken by political parties is of special significance, because 
they an important constituent of CVOs and have an interest in affecting the 
political system in which they operate. This explains their support for enacting 
the PLC law, accepted by NGOs. It explains their support for the autonomy of 
CVOs from government arbitrary interference. Nevertheless their stance draws, 
rightly, the attention of the NGOs to the need for more transparency and 
accountability, and to be weary of the agenda of funders, and focus on agendas 
that are more in tune with the needs of the Palestinian society and the 
detrimental and oppressive presence of colonial settler state.
No discussion of the confrontation over the NGOs can be complete 
without reference to the involvement of the local mass media particularly the 
local press. The intensity of the debate on the issue that was conducted 
publicly9, makes such a task necessary. We think that it is necessary to outline 
the thrust of the various views that were expressed on the issue in the local 
press. These can be organised in terms of hostility and friendliness to NGOs, or 
in terms of the profiles they portray of the NGOs.
The Heroic Profile of NGOs
The advocate, par excellence, of this view has been human rights organisations. 
These, together with PNGO-Palestinian NGO Network, issued on June the 16th, 
1999, a statement that denounced the campaign to discredit them10. The 
statement registered the following points:
9 Tens of articles, commentaries, reports and interviews appeared in the local press during the 
months of June and July, 1999. Many seminars and workshops were held during the period in 
the WB, and Gaza Strip, as well as television and radio discussions.
10 The signatories to the statement were: Addameer Association for Human Rights-Gaza; 
Addameer Prisoners' Support Association-West Bank; A1 Haq; Centre for the Treatment and 
Rehabilitation of Torture Victims; Freedom's Defence Centre; Gaza Community Mental 
Health Programme; Jerusalem Centre for Social and Economic Rights; Jerusalem Legal Aid 
Centre; LAW: The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the 
Environment; Palestinian Centre for Human Rights -  Gaza; Palestinian Counselling Centre; 
Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens’ Rights; Physicians for Human Rights- 




























































































1. That human Rights Organisations, “being part of the Palestinian civil 
society, have for long been at the forefront of activities defending human 
rights. They “have undertaken campaigns to challenge threats to the legal 
status of the occupied territories”. They have been active in the 
international public opinion to “ensure the application of international 
humanitarian law, in particular Fourth Geneva Convention, in the 
Occupied Territories”.
2. That a counter-campaign has been waged against human rights 
organisations “seeking to undermine their credibility and slander the 
reputation of those involved in these organisations”. The statement 
mentions, by name, the Minister of Justice, as leading the campaign with 
the aim of “diverting attention from important concerns affecting 
Palestinian human rights”. It further undermines the passage of the Law 
of Charitable Associations and Community Organisations in Palestine 
(the NGO law). Human rights organisations view this law as an 
achievement since it provides “legal protection to NGOs, while ensuring 
their accountability and ensuring the integrity of the development 
process”.
3. That the campaign “coincides with the President Arafat's suggestion to 
keep the NGOs under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior”11. This 
proposal was “rejected by the legislature, which accepted that NGOs 
could act with greater independence if the regulating of NGOs were with 
the Ministry of Justice”. The statement viewed the Ministry of the Interior 
as concerned with security and recalled that “a department of the Interior 
Ministry has undertaken a number of raids on NGOs”.
4. That human rights organisations “has strongly advocated for a 
democratic pluralist society, where human rights and the rule of law are 
respected by all, and that there is independence and separation between 
the arms of State (the executive, judiciary and legislature) to ensure this”. 
The signatories consider that these “efforts have succeeded in bringing
11 A press release issued by the director of the Gaza Community Mental Health Programme 
viewed, on the 14th, June, 1999 states: “Since the return of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA), the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have been targeted by systematic 
campaigns aimed at tarnishing their image and undermining their achievements... In the past 
few days, the anti-NGO campaigns resurfaced after the publication of the UNSCO report on 
funding the"Rule of Law" sector over the past five years. This sector includes the Ministry of 
Justice, courts, Attorney General's Office, Police, Forensic Lab, Palestinian Legislative 
Council, Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, and relevant NGOs. The 
report states that the funding for the NGOs under that sector for the past five years did not 




























































































attention to this and have encouraged others, including legislators and 
judges, to demand greater executive respect for the function of 
Palestinian institutions. The counter-campaign may be aimed at 
undermining these efforts”.
5. That, the Minister of Justice “has failed, as is the duty of his office, to 
support the independence of the judiciary and the legal process”. The 
signatories point out that “the Minister of Justice, on occasion, has 
intentionally interfered with the work of the courts and the officials of the 
court. In doing so, he may have breached domestic and international 
law”. They consider that the campaign has deflected attention away from 
“the crucial role of NGOs and human rights groups in promoting the 
development process and the basic rights of Palestinians wherever these 
are challenged. Instead, Palestinian civil society is obliged to defend 
itself against attacks made without foundation or justification”.
6. The statement end by requesting the president of PNA to:
- “Issue the Law of Charitable Associations and Community 
Organisations as passed by the Palestinian Legislative Council on its 
third reading,
- Promptly appoint an Attorney General to undertake the 
responsibilities incumbent on that office, particularly those 
responsibilities guaranteeing basic rights and democracy,
- Disclose the actual reasons that led to the failure of the Ministry of 
Justice to perform its duties in preparing the necessary legislature to 
consolidate judicial independence, ensuring guarantees for the judicial 
authority, and enforcing respect of the courts and its decisions,
- Challenge illegal approaches and claims voiced by a number of
Palestinian officials and ministers and confirm the commitment 
to democracy and the institutions, including NGOs, that 
promote these principles, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights”.
It is interesting that the signatories to the document ended by appealing 
the president of the PNA who not only delayed responding to the law passed by 
the PLC, but asked for changes that make the Ministry of Interior responsible 
for registration. It is worth noting that president of the PNA have been acting as 




























































































NGOs do not realise that the real issue of the confrontation concerns the 
drawing the boundary of the central authority in relation to “civil society”12.
The Villain Profile of NGOs
It was the Palestinian Minister of Justice who gave the latest confrontation its 
impact following the publication of the above-mentioned UNSCO report. He 
used the report to accuse Palestinian human rights organisations of 
politicisation and mismanagement. Apart from the data provided by the report 
on funds allocated to NGOS working in the human rights and démocratisation 
field, on specific evidence was given to substantiate the accusation of 
mismanagement, and no other governmental institution has provided evidence 
for these accusations13.
The timing of the confrontation made some NGOs link it with concerns 
about the legal system that came to the fore with the publication of a report by 
the UN Special Co-ordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO). Although 
the report was intended to assist the development of Palestinian institutions, 
including civil society, it found that "the rule of law related policies and the 
equally important to assist mechanisms to implement them remain substantially 
underdeveloped". It was this, many NGOs believed, that prompted the Minister 
of Justice take the opportunity, using the issue of funds to human rights 
organisations, to silence his human rights critics.
Some of human rights groups had voiced criticism of the management by 
the minister of Justice of his Ministry14. It is widely held that such criticism led
12 In a special issue of the news letter that PNGO-Palestine Network publishes, the Network 
tabulates a whole page on the services the NGOs provide in the fields of employment, health, 
training, agriculture, water and environment, Jerusalem, human rights, and that fact that 
funding to NGOs does not come from sources that aid the PNA (Al-Amel Al-Ahli, 5th, July 
1999). Much less attention was given to the fact that as part of civil society, their autonomy 
and diversity is necessary for a dynamic, and lively society and polity, and necessary for the 
mobilisation of various sectors of society for both development and achieving political 
independence.
13 Some NGOs, but by no means all, have taken measures to have their financial accounts 
scrutinised and published in the local newspapers, and have independent experts’ assessments 
of these accounts.
14
As an example, LAW, an NGO working on the field of human rights, published a report on 
1 June 1999 disclosing the Minister's personal and unlawful interference in judicial affairs. 
For instance, the report found that the Minister of Justice was instrumental in the dismissal of 
the Chief Justice, and that this dismissal seems to be connected with the Chief Justice's 




























































































the Minister of Justice to complain that human rights groups are not working 
according to their mandated goals but preparing "faulty reports that will harm 
our people”.
In interview with a local newspaper15, the Justice minister reported that 
his ministry is working to amend the law on NGOs in accordance with the 
amendments requested by the president of the PNA. He estimated the number of 
these organisations to exceed 700. The thrust of his remarks can be summarised 
as follows:
1. Many NGOs, especially those working in the human rights field have 
“become political bodies, mixing between political and human rights 
issues, and this is not acceptable at all”16. Adding that any one who want 
to engage in political action should join one of the many political parties 
than exist in Palestine since NGOs are barred from political activity”.
2. Millions of dollars from donors have been spent on NGOs, “as the 
UNSCO report shows”. This situation calls for a law to regulate the 
activity of NGOs, since being a “civil” institution does not imply “having 
absolute freedom, but demands limitations as elsewhere in the world”. 
The minister was careful to single out some NGOs, especially those 
“engaged in agricultural, health, and disability relief work”, as examples 
of NGOs that the PNA acknowledges, and values their role during the 
intifada. It is the NGOs that emerged after the establishment of the PNA 
that raise questions in the minister’s mind about their role in fighting the 
occupation.
3. It is clear that there are those in the leadership of the PNA who feel 
that donors are more forthcoming to NGOs than to the PNA. Figures are 
quoted that reveal that while donor countries committed themselves US$ 
779 in aid to the PNA for the year 1998, only US$ 351 was actually 
transferred. In comparison, US$ 59 were committed, for the same year, to 
NGOs of which US$ 43 was actually transferred17.
5 A/ Ayyam, 26/6/1999.
16 The director of LAW rejected the accusation that human rights organisations engage in 
political activities. He responded to the accusation by explaining that ‘human rights activities 
have political dimensions... and part of the tasks of human rights organisations is to initiate 
change in policies to improve human rights conditions, and work with parliamentarians to 
pass legislation guarantying conditions, and this is the secret of the relationship between the 
political and civil” (ibid.).
17 NGOs were quick to point out to the PNA that transferring less to Palestinian NGOs does 




























































































As we explained earlier the new confrontation with the NGOs, is related to 
attempts to change the law that the PLC passed. This is clear from the editorial 
of a journal published by the Union of national Non-governmental 
Organisations. This Union was established in 1995, as a body to counter to the 
PNGO - Palestinian Network, and is linked to the president’s office. The 
editorial dwells on the followings themes18:
1. The proposed changes in the PLC law threaten the interests of those 
who stand at the top of NGOs. Those who lead NGOs have turned these 
into monopolies that no one is allowed to challenge. Hence their 
campaign to prevent changes requested by the president of the PNA.
2. Some members of the PLC have enriched themselves from their 
positions in NGOs and, and their “multi-national companies”, and their 
parliamentary immunity are allied with NGOs. The implication here, is 
that the PLC law on NGOs has been passed because such a law serves the 
interest of some members of the PLC who have positions in the NGOs.
3. NGOs have become to form a “shadow government”, and centres of 
power, and many are extensions of political parties that use the discourse 
of development, human rights, civil society, women and children rights, 
zakat (alms giving), religion and charity as cover for political activity. 
These groups have used the diversity of laws in the West Ban, Jerusalem, 
and Gaza Strip to register these NGOs. The main implication here is that 
many of these NGOs have left-wing agendas and connections, or act on 
behalf of Islamist political groups.
4. The Ministry of Interior is the only body that is entitled and capable of 
granting permits to NGOs, political parties, clubs and all that comes 
under “civil society”, since it is the body that can oversee, supervise, and 
follow up retrospectively.
5. In previous editorials and articles the same journal accused some 
NGOs of acting as foreign agents. This accusation has appeared in 
various forms in many of the articles that appeared in the local press. The 
most frequent form is the labelling of NGOs as donor driven.
The Ambivalent Profile o f NGOs
One of the striking features of that new confrontation between the government 
(and more precisely sectors of the government) and the NGOs, is its openness. 
Tens of editorials, articles, reportage, and comments appeared in the local
nAl-Neshra, Number 5, May 1999. The editor is the general co-ordinator of the Council of 
the Union of No-govemmental Organisations in the Gaza Strip. The journal serialised a book 
published recently in Egypt on NGOs accusing them of acting to implement foreign agendas 




























































































newspapers, and journals on the issue. Local television and radio stations (in the 
WB), as well as the official television and radio, ran programmes on the issue. 
So apart from those views which portray untarnished profile of NGOs, and 
those that portray a sinister profile of NGOs, a third view can be detected which 
examined the NGOs from a critical and somewhat sceptical perspective19.
This is a perspective that rejects the portrait of NGOs as a source of evil, 
alienation, corruption, and as an instrument of foreign domination. 
Simultaneously it questions the self-portrait of the NGOs as the moral 
conscience of society. It submits a profile, with varied accents, that 
accommodates the existence of “errors and ills” among NGOs. Some find the 
roots of these in the social structure, and the present “lack of a vision 
concerning the shape and mechanisms of the desired political system, as well as 
in the limited steps taken to actualise the rule of law”. It acknowledges “the 
vital role that the NGOs have, and are playing, as providers of various kinds of 
services aimed at improving the standard of living of citizens”. But goes on to 
calls for a review of “non-existent NGOs, the practice of favouritism, 
concentration of powers in the hands of directors of these organisations, waste, 
and corruption that take place in some of these”. Some, in this category, goes on 
to label some NGOs as taking over the role of “political parties”, at a time when 
some political parties “have turned themselves into NGOs”. It is perspective 
that calls for autonomy of NGOs not only in relation to the government, but also 
to foreign donors. It demands their subjection to transparency and inspection. It 
sees the present confrontation as rooted in the intolerance on the part of the 
government towards some NGOs, and its inability to understand their situation, 
or see their achievements. It acknowledges that some in government seeks to 
make NGOs appear no better than the government in terms of transparency, 
accountability, and performance, with the aim of controlling these. It includes 
government functionaries, and their families as involved in NGOs and not just 
members of the PLC. References can be find that find explanations to the 
confrontation in the “exile mentality” which seeks hegemony on civil 
organisations a as it had known no other experience.
19 Examples of this narrative can found in a number of articles that appeared in the local 
press, such as: Hani Al-Alma’ri, Al-Ayyam, 26/6/1999; George Gaicaman, Al-Ayyam, 
28/6/1999,- Talal Oukel,, Al-Ayyam, 21/6/1999; Sameeh Shibeeb, Al-Ayyam, 21/6/1999; 
Ahmed Harb, Al-Ayyam, 19/6/1999; Ashraf Al’ajrami, Al-Ayyam, 22/6/1999; interview with 
leaders of political parties which included Fateh, Peoples Party, Democratic Front, Fida, Al- 
Hayyat Al-Jadida, 6/7/1999; interview with Raja Shihada, Al-Hayyat Al-Jadida, 11/7/1999; 
Al-Baydar, news letter published by the Development Study Programme- Birzeit University, 
issue Number 12, 5/7/1999; Khalida Gerrar, Al-Hayyat Al-Jadida, 20/7/1999), Maher Farraj, 




























































































This perspective suggest that the answer to the confrontation and the 
issues it raised lies in developing a political system that guarantee the rule of 
law, separation of powers, the peaceful transfer of power, freedom of 
expression, and political pluralism. It call for a clear delineation of 
responsibilities of the various ministries, and government agencies. It calls for 
applying the “principles” of accountability, transparency, and participation, in 
society and government. It short it adopts a discourse of democracy and good 
governance. Some stress the bureaucratisation of the NGOs and the alienation 
from their social base, and the need to reform their administrative and salary 
structures. A demand to scrutinise the agendas of donors “as some are driven by 
political and security aims”.
C. An Inconclusive Outcome of the Confrontation
It is not easy to determine all the ramifications of the confrontation 
between the government, and Palestinian NGOs. However a number of 
observations can be made on the process as revealed in this confrontation:
1. On the 12th of August 1999, the PLC accepted the amendment to NGO 
law demanded by the president20. This opens the way to promulgation of 
the law. It should be pointed out, here, that the amendment made does not 
affect the bulk of the law, but are confined to the governmental body 
entrusted with registration, and it remains an issue of registration and not 
licensing. It does however make intervention in the work and funding of 
NGOs more likely depending on the by-laws that will regulate the 
application of the law. It also must be noted, here, that the government 
does not have a united position on the autonomy or otherwise of NGOs. 
Many ministries have competed for registration (including the ministry of 
social affairs, ministry of planning, ministry of labour, ministry of 
interior, ministry of justice, and the newly established ministry of civil 
action). This is also reflected in the recommendations (not published) of 
the ministerial committee on NGOs which, according to its chairman, 
came out in favour of most NGOs21 *. The committee recommended the
20This was done in the following manner: As the members of the PLC were leaving the hall 
where they were discussing the public budget, the Speaker read the following statement: “ The 
Council having consulted all legal bodies, arrived at the conclusion, that the objection of the 
president regarding the NGOs law is a correct one”. He concluded that the NGOs law is, 
therefore, promulgated, and the Ministry of Interior is the legal body for registration o f NGOs
(Al-Ayyam, 13/8/1999, p.5).
21 A ministerial committee was appointed to study the situation of NGOs and make 
recommendations to the cabinet. The committee did convene, and consulted with NGOs and it 




























































































approval of the NGOs law, attributing the main cause of the confrontation 
to the absence of a unified law22. This lack of unity within executive 
power on the issue of NGOs (some ministries have established co­
operative relations with NGOs active in the same field such as health and 
agriculture) is a factor, among others, in hindering the imposition of a 
repressive legislation similar those operating in Egypt or Jordan. Other 
factors include the very recent militant history of NGOs against the Israeli 
occupation. In addition the affiliations that many NGOs had (and some 
still have) with political parties is another factor, as well as the fact that 
many donors of NGOs are also donors of the PNA23. The fact that NGOs 
provide employment to many thousands of individuals in a situation 
characterised by relatively high unemployment rates and economic 
precariousness, is relevant here. To this should be added the fact that 
many NGOs are service providers that are not, or could not be, adequately 
covered by the PNA.
2. It is likely that the campaign did have some impact on the sphere of 
public opinion. It has tarnished, to some extent, the image of NGOs, but 
not to a very significant extent. In a public opinion poll, conducted during 
the heat of campaign some 43% of those surveyed thought corruption 
exists in NGOs, compared to 31% who thought that it did not exist and, 
26% who had no opinion24. On the other hand some 59% of those 
interviewed evaluated the performance of NGOs positively, compared to 
40% of those who did the same regarding the performance of the PLC, 
47% regarding the performance of the cabinet, 58% regarding the 
performance of the presidency, and 32% regarding the performance of 
opposition parties25. In other words NGOs received a higher positive 
evaluation than all PNA structures and opposition parties (which form 
part of civil society).
“ Reported in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, 6/7/1999.
“ The World Bank and European donors (governments and NGOs) give special importance to 
civic institutions.
24 Centre for Palestine Research and studies (CPRS), poll Number 42, 15-17 July, 1999. The 
sample size of the poll was 1330 of Palestinians aged 18 years and above (824 in WB and 506 
in GS). The margin of error is put at 3%). This is the first time that a question of this kind was 
concerning NGOs, which makes it difficult to make comparison with pre-campaign attitudes 
towards these organisations.
25No significant differences existed in the evaluation of the performance by political 
affiliation. Some 65% of the supporters of Fateh and 68% of the supporters of Hamas 
evaluated the performance of NGOs positively. However difference appeared by region (a 
higher percentage evaluated the performance of NGOs positively in Gaza Strip than the WB), 
age (a higher percentage of the young evaluated positively the performance of NGOs), 





























































































3. The role of the press and mass media is very relevant here, as the 
main newspapers were divided in terms of their attitude to the issue. The 
closest newspaper to the government tended to give prominence to 
attacks on the NGOs, while more independent newspapers gave more 
prominence to the positive role of the NGOs and to more “objective” 
analytic views. This applies to television stations; the private ones (exist 
in West Bank only) tended to be more favourable to NGOs than the PNA 
financed station.
4. The confrontation was conducted with discourse that used the 
language of democracy (separation of power, rule of law, pluralism, 
freedom of expression and association) and good governance 
(transparency, accountability, and participation). All the players in the 
field (government, political parties, NGOs, PLC, and the press), used this 
discourse. This reflects, to some degree, the influence of CVOs in the 
formulation of civil/political discourse. What is particular about this 
confrontation is the application of the civil discourse of democracy on 
NGOs themselves in attempt to discredit them and bring them under state 
supervision. This points to the need to situate civil discourse in the 
context of power relations. Hence the “hegemony” of a democratic civil 
discourse is not necessarily reflect the actual workings of the political 
system. A system that remains, in many aspects autocratic. Not does it 
necessarily reflect the actual workings of CSOs. Most CSOs still lack a 
credible level of transparency and accountability and the necessary 
democratic structures (internally and in relation with their target group or 
beneficiaries). A majority of NGOs lacks the necessary autonomous 
resources to be self-sustaining, and this leaves them open to the charge of 
being donor-driven. This explains why NGOs did not mobilise their 
social base (beneficiaries) in the confrontation with the government, nor 
did they win support from trade unions or professional associations.
5. One outcome of the confrontation was the decision of the president of 
PNA to create a ministry of ‘civic action”. The mandate of the ministry 
remains, up to the moment of writing, unclear. The appointed minister has 
declared that he favours the presidential amendment regarding the 
ministry for registering NGOs, and that he seeks “to support the NGOs 
sector, not to suppress it”. He reiterated the necessity for NGOs not to 
engage in political activities (without defining what qualifies as political 
activity), and his intention to formulate a memorandum of understanding 
between NGOs and ministries working in the same field. He also 
expressed interest in reviving voluntary work that declined in the 1990s, 
and an interest in encouraging NGOs to do more work in rural areas26.





























































































6. The confrontation suggests a need for most NGOs, to operate more 
effectively in their varied fields of activity. The fact that the 
“beneficiaries” of these organisations did form a lobby in support of their 
“benefactors” is indicative of the relationship between the two. This calls 
for a much higher degree of transparency, more assertiveness of 
autonomous agendas, the overcoming of the anti-democratic tendencies 
of organisational hierarchies, and a more active participatory approach 
towards targeted groups. NGOs also need to establish more structured 
relations with other sectors of civil society (especially political parties, 
trade unions, women organisations, and professional organisations). But 
they need, sooner than later, to acquire financial autonomy without which 
they remain susceptible, to the reproach of being donor-driven.
Case Two:
Presidency versus Parliament
The confrontation between the president of the Palestinian National Authority 
(PNA), and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) over the role of the latter 
does not involve, directly, a state-society narrative. But it needs addressing 
nevertheless. It is significant for such narrative, because of its historical context. 
It is a context where a central authority on a territory without clear boundaries is 
trying to form a state under conditions of adversity. It is situation where self- 
government is entangled in a colonial situation. The PNA encased in a situation 
where it is committed to a long process of negotiation, which carries no real 
prospect of delivering statehood with sovereignty. Thus the confrontation 
between the centre of the newly established authority (the presidency) and the 
similarly newly elected legislative council (parliament), although it does not 
connect directly with civil society, has, nevertheless, direct ramifications on the 
latter’s relations with the state, and to the establishment of good governance. It 
so because it connects to the issue of power distribution that shapes the political 
system, and determines whether civil institutions can function with the 
necessary autonomy; and whether citizenship rights are enshrined as 
constitutional rights.
This case study will focus on attempts by a newly elected legislative 
council to exercise enforceable oversight and decision-making powers on broad 
policy and budgetary issues. That is to exercise oversight over executive power. 
Two attempts are illustrative of this: 1. Drafting and passing a Basic Law, and





























































































The Basic Law; the PLC Approves, the President does not promulgate
The general election law that was approved, in 1995, by the president of the 
PNA stated in its preamble that one of the main tasks of the Legislative Council 
(PLC) to be elected is to draft and approve a basic law for the interim period. 
The Interim Agreement between the PLO and Israel allows, as was specified in 
the PLC Standing Orders, legislative and oversight powers to the Council. 
These include; drafting and adopting of legislation, voting or withholding 
confidence from the Ministerial Council, approving, or otherwise, the General 
Budget and the general development plan of the PNA, and addressing questions 
and inquiries to ministers concerning issues within their jurisdiction. In short 
the Council has the right to legislate in all matters excepts on issues excluded by 
the interim agreements between the PLO and Israel. The proposed Basic Law, 
approved by the Council but not ratified by the President, gives the Council the 
power to approve agreements.
The interim agreement specified the interim period to last five years 
starting from the date of the establishment of the PNA in May 1994. 
Constitutions of a number of Arab countries were consulted in drafting the law, 
as well as the legal committee of the PNC, and the Law Faculty at Birzeit 
University. The PLC approved the Basic Law (third reading) on the 2nd of 
October 1997, and submitted to the PNA president on the 4lh of October 199727, 
for promulgation. Two years have passed since and the president has not 
promulgated the Basic law. In fact the interim period was supposed to have 
ended in May 1999, but was extended by the PCC (Palestinian Central Council) 
with the intention of declaring a Palestinian state in some unspecified future 
date. The PCC decided, at the same time, to have a constitution drafted for the 
coming state. This means that the Basic Law will remain, at a best, a document 
to be consulted by those who are entrusted to draw the constitution of the future 
state.
The question that is being asked; is why the Basic Law has not been 
promulgated? The question becomes more pertinent once the political 
composition of the PLC is revealed. Supporters of Fateh (the ruling party) form 
77% of the members of the PLC, a very wide majority by any standards. The 
PLC has acquired this composition mostly because Fateh remains the largest 
political party, because both the secular and the Islamic opposition boycotted 
the elections of 1966, as a gesture against the Oslo agreement, and as a result of 
the election law which local bases, and majoritarian rather than representational.
27A general discussion of the law took place on the 10th of July 1996, and the first and second 
reading on the 1st of September of the same year. The third reading and final reading took 




























































































So a Council dominated by the party of the president approved the basic law. In 
other words the president has not withheld promulgating the basic law because 
it was passed by a parliament controlled by a majority of opposition parties. 
Hence the answer to the above question must be sought elsewhere. It can not be 
found in features related to the interim period, either. The Basic Law was 
drafted to take account of the specifications of Oslo II concerning arrangements 
for the interim period. We need to look in the restructuring of power relations 
that is implicated in the Basic Law. Particularly in that it establishes basic 
constitutional principles that govern the relationship between the executive, and 
legislative powers, and asserts the independence of the judiciary, and spells out 
citizens’ rights. Among the things it stipulates are the following:
1. The separation of powers (legislative, executive, and judiciary”, 
and the independence of the judiciary;
2. The system of government in Palestine is defined as “a democratic 
parliamentary system that is based on political and party pluralism, 
where the president of the PNA is elected directly by the people, and 
the government is accountable to the president and the PLC”;
3. Freedom from arrest, search, imprisonment, and restriction 
without a court order; as well as from being subject to torture or 
duress. The accused is considered innocent until his guilt is proven 
in a proper court of law that guarantees the right to self-defence;
4. Freedom of expression is guaranteed as well as the right to form 
and join political parties, to form and join trade unions, associations, 
clubs, solidarities, and popular institutions. It guarantees the right to 
establish newspapers, and other mass media. Censorship of mass 
media, in its various forms, is illegal.
4. The legislative Council has the right to propose laws, to question 
ministers, to withdraw confidence from the government or any 
minister, to approve the general development plan, to approve, and 
change the budget.
5. In case the position of the president becomes vacant, the speaker 
of the PLC assumes the responsibilities of the president for a period 
that does not exceed 60 days, during which general democratic and 
free elections will be held to elect a new president.
6. If the president returns, for amendments, a proposed law passed 
by the PLC, the latter will review the law again, and if a two-thirds 
majority approves it, it becomes law, and will be published without 
delay in the official gazette. The president has to return a proposed 
law to the PLC within one month from the day it is sent to him, 





























































































It is clear from the above provisions of the Basic Law, that it restricts the 
powers of the presidency by devolving some of these to the PLC, and to the 
judiciary. It also grants the PLC powers to oversee and censor the government. 
This explains why a number of the members of the PLC interviewed could not 
find any explanation for the president withholding approval of the basic law 
other than it limits and defines his powers and that of the government. The 
proposed basic law specifies the basic constitutional requirements of a 
democratic political system through institutionalising the separation of powers 
and of citizen’s rights, and a multiparty electoral system. It furthermore lays the 
basis, for the legislative council, to unify and modernise the system of law 
operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
It is the existing distribution of power that the Basic Law disturbs, and 
this is the explanation why it was ignored by the president of the PNA. In an 
interview on the issue with one PLC member, he had the following explanation 
for why the president has not promulgated the basic law:
“the real reasons why the president has objected to the basic law resides in the fact that 
the idea of the rule of law is not any idea congenial to the Palestinian political 
leadership. The leadership thinks that the existence of laws and legislation will restrict 
its movements at this stage. It wants to have a high degree of freedom in decision 
making. Secondly, the operation of a basic law involves a separation of powers, and 
this means division of powers. Thirdly, I don not think that the political leadership is 
ready to share power with others, not with the legislative power, nor with the judicial 
power. Furthermore, the Basic law defines a democratic mechanism for transfer of
power at the presidential level, and this does not seem to appeal to the president, and
28this is in harmony with the long history of political leader” .
Another PLC member explained the reasons that led the president of the PNA to 
ignore the Basic Law, as follows:
“The president wants a constitution for the Palestinian people and a Palestinian state, 
and therefore he wants the PLO, being the representative of the Palestinians 
everywhere to participate in the drafting the constitution. Secondly he thinks that the 
time is not appropriate for having a Basic Law, because of the inability to define the 
borders, and nationality and the capital as these issues are not finally defined and
agreed upon. However we (PLC) specifies the Basic Law for the interim period , „29 only 289
28From an interview with Azmi Al-Shu’abi, PLC member, on 3/8/1999 (The interview for a 
study by the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS) on the relation between 
NOGs and the PA, and supervised by J.Hilal).




























































































Another PLC member thought that the Basic Law is necessary for “transporting 
Palestinian society from revolutionary legitimacy to constitutional legitimacy”. 
He could not accept any of the reasons for the delay in signing the Basic Law by 
the president, as this was specified in the election law signed by the president. 
He thought, as a lawyer, that the Basic Law is necessary for unifying the legal 
system in Palestine, and providing the constitutional nucleus of the impending 
Palestinian State30.
Thus instead of having a Basic Law providing a unified constitutional 
framework for the Palestinian Authority, a mixture of inherited laws and codes 
exit. This has helped in the emergence of system of government with an 
excessive concentration of presidential power, rule by decree, selective use of 
legal codes, and disrespect for democratic procedure.
The PLC Disembodied
The disempowering of the PLC by denying it the role of furnishing the PNA 
with a constitutional document was coupled with frustrating its attempts to 
exercise effective oversight over executive authority. This failure is clearest in 
the PLC attempt to censor the executive on evidence of corruption and 
mismanagement. The General Control Institute (GCI), which was established by 
a presidential decree in 1995, published, in the Spring of 1997, its first annual 
report for 196631. The report implicated a number ministers and public high 
official in various forms of corruption, waste and mismanagement.
The report had a strong impact on various sections of Palestinian civil 
society32, and caught the attention of international donors. The PLC reacted by 
forming, in May 1997, a special committee to study the report and present 
recommendations to the Council. This it did a month later. The committee was 
critical of some aspects of the GCI report, particularly for its lack of 
methodological rigour, numerical exactness, enough specificity and selectivity 
as it did not covers all public institutions, and excluded security agencies and 
state owned companies33. Nevertheless the GCI report provided the material and
From an interview(as ibid) with Abd A-Karim Abu Salah, PLC member, 4/8/ 1999.
31 The report, parts of which were published in May 1997, indicated that some US$ 323 of 
public money were misused or wasted during 1996 by the government.
32 The report had an impact on public opinion. Thus while 49% of the public believed, in 
September 1996 (that is before the report), thought that ‘corruption” exists in PNA 
institutions, in June 1997 (after the content of the report became known) the percentage rose 
to 63%. Among the educated (who are more likely had read was leaked from the report) the 
percentage reached 78%.
33 Security agencies come under the direct control of the president, and some public 




























































































the opportunity for the committee to provide recommendations to question and 
censor the performance of the government.
The report included recommendations to initiate investigations into the 
affairs of a number of ministries, and for the prosecutor general to start legal 
proceedings against a number of ministers and high official. The PLC special 
committee report emphasised the absence of a role the Ministerial Council in 
drafting and implementing regulations specifying the functions and 
responsibilities of each ministry, and public body. It recorded the continuation 
of conflict over responsibilities among the ministries and the overlapping of 
these. A matter that contributed to the inflation of employment in the public 
sector, and the mushrooming of duplicate public institutions. It emphasised the 
absence of a plan of action for the ministerial body. The report concluded by 
calling on the president of the PNA dissolve the ministerial council and to form 
a new council ‘from technocrats and specialists”, and to make sure than none of 
the ministers implicated and convicted are returned to the council. It called for 
implementing a comprehensive administrative and organisational reform of all 
the public institutions and bodies. It call form the separation of the meetings of 
the ministerial council from those of ‘the Palestinian leaderships” which 
combines PLO institutions with PNA institutions, as this obliterates lines of 
responsibilities and accountability34.
The Council approved the above recommendations, and waited for the 
president to act. However the president took no action. The president did not 
accept the resignation of a large number of ministers following the decisions of 
the PLC. In short everything continued as before, despite the continued demand 
by the PLC for action on its decisions.
Not only the PLC failed to initiate reform, and to pressure the president to 
act to combat mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency. The Council was 
manipulated to change its tune a year later when a majority gave a vote of 
confidence to an enlarged ministerial council which contained almost all the 
members of the older council35, particularly the ministers that draw most 
criticism of corruption and mismanagement from the PLC.
In August 1998, after months of delay and in an obvious challenge to the PLC, 
the president announced his new cabinet to the Legislative Council. All the 
ministers who draw the harshest criticism from the PLC for corruption and
34 The PLC special committee report was published in Palestine Policy, Volume 4, Numbers 
15&16, 1997.
35The new cabinet had all the ministers of the older cabinet, except for the minister of labour 
who resigned some months previously in protest to the president interference in the ministry, 




























































































mismanagement were retained in the new and enlarged cabinet. Instead of a 
majority giving vote of no confidence to the new cabinet, 55, out of the total of 
88 members, granted it confidence. Only 28 gave a vote of no confidence, with 
3 abstaining36. The new 32-member cabinet had 22 from the PLC (i.e., a quarter 
of the total membership of the Council)37. Some of the loudest critics of the 
government (all from the ruling party) were given ministerial posts. 
Furthermore Fateh (the ruling party) members of the Council were lobbed to 
give a vote of confidence to the new cabinet.
One member of the PLC considered the new cabinet as “reflecting an 
indifference to the PLC and all the committees that were formed to examine the 
GCI report all of which implicated ministers of the old cabinet and who have 
been reinstated in the new cabinet”. He considered the new cabinet as an 
attempt to preempt the PLC and to create a ministerial block inside it38.
The Outcome
What we see here is the success of the president in marginalising the PLC. But 
this success cannot be isolated from the political composition of the latter. As 
mentioned earlier three quarters of the PLC are supporters of Fateh, the ruling 
party. One need to notice the method of co-option used, by the president, where 
a quarter of the PLC occupy posts in the latest cabinet. The absence of a Basic 
Law (or a constitutional framework) that defines citizenship, the technologies of 
rule, and the limits of central power are other factors which created space for 
manipulation by the president39. This unprincipled behaviour of the PLC 
increased the its negative image among the Palestinian public. The percentage 
of those who evaluated the performance of the PLC as positive (good or very 
good) dropped from 49% in March 1998 (before the vote of confidence), to 
29% in October 1998 (after the vote of confidence). Those who evaluated the 
performance negatively (bad and very bad) increased from 13% to 22% in the 
period40.
36 Two members of the Council were absent.
37 The new cabinet was enlarged by ten ministers. Only one of the member cabinet members 
declined, and another two from the older cabinet whose posts were changed ( one from 
minister of higher education to minister of tourism, the other from minister of agriculture to a 
minister without portfolio).
38 Jawad Al-Tibi, Palestine Policy, Volume 5, number 20, 1998.
39 On this and other related issues, see: The Palestinian Independent Commission for 
Citizen’s Rights, Third Annual Report, Ramallah, February 1998.




























































































Special attention needs to be given to the emerging political system that 
is dominated by one political party. This party {Fateh) not only dominates the 
PLC, but also the executive bodies of the PNA (ministries, the security 
apparatuses, governors, and the local government’s offices through 
appointments). The Speaker of the PLC, and his two Deputies, The Secretary 
General (i.e. the Office of the Council which is an elected body), and well as the 
majority of the members of the PLC committees are from same party. This 
could not have been avoided given the electoral law adopted, and the boycott of 
PLC elections by the opposition parties. But one cannot ignore the implications 
this has on the ability of the PLC to perform some of its basic functions. Thus 
despite the fact that the PLC has acquired a noticeable degree of institutional 
dynamism as a legislative body, it cannot isolate itself from the political 
composition of its members41. An electoral system of proportional 
representation would guard, to some extent, against an easy mobilisation of the 
Council by the ruling party.
The weakening of the role legislative body in overseeing the executive, 
the absence of an independent judiciary, the absence of a unified constitutional 
document, as well as the deadlock in the political negotiations with Israel has 
left a general sense of apathy and disillusionment. It no doubt encouraged the 
presidential office to attempt42, as happened later, and is documented in one of 
the case studies, to control NGOs as part of civil society. The case discussed 
here shows the vital importance of an effective legislative body, and the 
separation of powers for the protection of citizen’s rights, for good governance, 
and for the existence of viable civil institutions. It shows too that a legislative 
body dominated by one political party, is liable to manipulated and turned into a 
mbber stamp for the policy those a the top of the executive power, particularly 
if these are from the same party as it is the case in Palestine.
41 PLC did, however, develop a perceptible degree of institutional dynamism of its own since 
it was established. This has manifested itself in a number of ways: It has its own rules 
(Standing Orders), and it has procedure for debate, questions and agenda setting. A Chief 
Clerk, who oversees the record-keeping system, including the preparation of minutes, journal 
and Hansard for each session assists the Office of the Council, during the meetings. Its 
members are organised into various committees with different agendas.
12 The fact that the President of the PNA, is also the chairman of the Executive Committee of 





























































































Refugee Mobilisation and the Political Legitimacy of the PNA
The status of Palestinian refugees inside the Palestinian territories and in their 
refugee camps the three main Arab host countries (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) 
continue to be a primary source of tension between the attempts of the PNA at 
state building, and the unfulfilled aspirations of the refugees to achieve their 
political rights. The tension has several sources: (a) the presence of a large 
camp population constituting a considerable segment of the urban poor posits a 
potential pool for popular mobilisation against social and political grievances, 
which could undermine the autocratic character of the nascent Palestinian 
authority; (b) it exposes the limited ability of the Palestinian leadership in 
negotiating a reasonable agreement with the Israelis that will guarantee minimal 
rights of the refugees who chose to return to their homeland; (c) it continues to 
undermine the legitimacy of the whole peace process since the Palestinian 
problem has been presenting itself, and is seen by the Arab world, as a refugee 
issue; (d) within the Arab countries—particularly in Lebanon the absence of a 
deal which will realise-at least partially-the right of Palestinians in Lebanon to 
return will be attacked severely since the Lebanese authorities refuse to 'solve' 
the problem of refugees through naturalisation on their own soul, since this is 
likely to upset the delicate confessional political set-up the triggered the civil 
war in 1976, and in which the Palestinian military involvement was a primary 
factor in prolonging that war.
In this case study we will address only the first and second feature of this 
problem. In short we will address the manner in which the transformation of the 
Palestinian issue from a struggle for the right o f return of the refugees, to one of 
state building by a limited number of returnees (some 80.000 PLO cadres who 
were repatriated to Palestine in 1994-1996) continues to act as a source of 
unrest in the camps—both inside and outside Palestine.
Current refugee mobilisation as residue of the intifada
The civil insurrection against Israeli colonial rule (known as the intifada-1981- 
1993) was a rebellion that was primarily instigated and sustained by refugee 
camps (first in Jabalyah and neighbouring Gaza camps, and then in Balata 
[Nablus] where it spread to other West Bank townships and villages). Refugee 
camp youth were a primary target for the Israeli army during the rebellion and 
they constituted a substantial component of the number of youth organisers, 
prisoners, and martyrs during the intifada. With the fifth year of the rebellion 
the toll of strikes, unemployment, imprisonment and killing ushered an 




























































































the beginning of political negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis. 
With the signing of the Oslo Agreement (1993) and the return of the PLO 
cadres to the West Bank and Gaza a process of youth demobilisation began. 
Many of the refugee camp militants were incorporated in the Palestinian 
security apparatus and the new civilian bureaucracy of the PNA. Few of those 
militants (like Dalai Salameh and Jamal Shati) were eventually elected to the 
Palestinian Assembly in 1996 and became spokespersons for the refugee camps 
that sent them to the Parliament. However the vast expectations ushered by the 
peace agreement where far from fulfilling refugee expectations:
* Conditions of daily life in the camps did not improve. Because of the 
severe closure against the entry of Israeli workers to Israel the peace 
agreement was followed by severe rise in unemployment and drop in the 
standard of living—although here distinction should be made between 
Gaza camps and West Bank camps, since in the former areas the hermetic 
sealing of borders creates a considerably worse possibilities for labour 
mobility.
* Very few refugees from Jordan, Lebanon and Syria were able to come 
back to Palestine even for a visit. And the 80,000 cadres who did come 
back with the PLO were a one-time agreement that was not followed by a 
relaxation of border control on returning expatriates or even visitors.
* The four-country committee (known as the quadripartite group), which 
was established by the Oslo agreement to deal with the displaced persons 
from refugee camps, was unable to prevail on the Israeli to allow even a 
limited number of refugees to come home. Only a limited number of 
2,000 cases of family reunification were granted. (Since mid-1999 these 
cases were raised to 3,000).
The consequence of these failures was that many refugee camp youth who 
fought street and alley battles during the intifada - then in their teens, now in 
their mid-twenties - were now frustrated and unable to claim a sense of 
achievement for their struggles. In Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, camp refugees 
felt forsaken and betrayed by the Oslo agreement since it delayed their status to 
final status negotiations (beginning in 1999-2000).
Post Oslo Refugee Popular Committees
In 1995 several young camp militants began to form Youth Activities Centres in 
several refugee camps in anticipation of the Oslo Agreement not realising any 




























































































Nablus (where Fateh had the upper hand) and in Dheisheh camp in Bethlehem 
(where the communists and Popular Front activists predominated). The thrusts 
of these youth centres were to emphasise two objectives: asserting the right of 
return enshrined in UN resolution 194, and improving the conditions of living 
in the camp. By September of 1996, around the same time that national 
elections were taking place for the first Palestinian legislative assembly, a new 
camp leadership was emerging in which all political factions were represented 
(including Hamas and Jihad, as well as the left parties and Fateh). These groups 
took the same format and name of intifada groups: the Popular Committees—but 
unlike the former popular committees these ones had limited objectives: 
affirming refugee political rights, and warning the PNA from making a deal 
which will write off their right of return. They also proposed a platform for 
improving daily living conditions of camp dwellers (health, sewage and 
education committees) in co-ordination with UNRWA. Although some of the 
political groups had internal elections in choosing camp representatives the 
actual representation was factional43. Popular Committees in each camp 
(ranging in number from 20-35 members) became a main focus of debate and 
mobilisation for refugee rights and against 'concessions' anticipated by the final 
status negotiations.
One major arena of these debates was the participation of refugees in the 
forthcoming elections for municipal councils in urban and rural communities of 
Palestine. For the duration of Israeli occupation of these communities (1967- 
1995) refugee camp population had been excluded from both the electoral role 
and candidacy for municipal elections. The rationale for this exclusion (so far 
largely accepted by the refugees themselves) was that political enfranchisement 
of camps into the urban constituencies would signal their resettlement and civic 
integration into the host societies, thereby forsaking their struggle for return and 
repatriation to their original homes. With the passage of decades this conscious 
act of disenfranchisement became a political anomaly, since it entailed 
withdrawal from urban local political and non-participation in decision-making 
that affected the provision of services, allocation of tax revenue, and zoning 
laws, and so on. In partial compensation for this denial of municipal rights 
refugee camp population established local committee which collaborated with 
UNRWA in the daily administration of camp life. In Lebanon and Syria (but not 
in Jordan), political factions undertook this role of local administration, with the 
concurrence of the host governments who continued to deny citizenship to 
refugee residents. This logic however was abandoned in the Palestinian 
parliamentary elections of 1996 when camp refugees participated as electors 
and candidates with few of them carrying several refugee constituencies in




























































































Nablus, Ramallah, and Gaza. The rationale here was that these were national 
and not local elections.
Nevertheless with the establishment of the new National Authority 
several refugee activists began to question this 'strategy' of voluntary 
disenfranchisement. Dalai Salameh, Parliament deputy from Balata camp, and a 
Fateh activist, spearhead a campaign among refugees calling for improvement 
of housing and infrastructural conditions in camps. She also called for re­
considering the exclusion of camp residents from the planned municipal 
elections. Although there was a substantial support for this position, there was 
also a strong counter-move. During the 1997-98 period the announced cut in 
UNRWA budget and the reduction of welfare services led many refugee leaders 
to feel that this was a step aimed at the liquidation of UNRWA and a prelude to 
a scheme of resettlement. A country wide conference of refugee faction leaders 
met in Jericho in September 1998 and issued a proclamation supporting local 
camp elections to establish autonomous administrative councils that are 
independent from municipal councils. This formula was seen as a compromise 
between the advocates of municipal representation and its opponents, assuring 
the creation of an enhanced constituency in camps.
But the debate over municipal representation continues and has taken a 
much wider political dimension. Under initiative from Abdallah Hourani, who 
held the Culture portfolio in the PLO executive committee, mass meetings took 
place in a number of Gaza camps in the spring of 1996 calling for the 
implementation of G.A. resolution 194 and against accepting a package of 
compensation without ensuring the right of return. Hourani - a leading critic of 
the Oslo Agreement— voted against the amendment of the Palestinian Charter in 
the PNC meeting in April of 1966. With the mushrooming of popular 
committees in camps, and their adoption of stances critical of the authority, 
Hourani was removed from the Executive Committee and replaced by As'ad 
Abdul Rahman as the head of the Refugee Committee. The immediate cause of 
the replacement was Hourani's call for a national conference of refugee 
committees in order to establish a national refugee leadership in the country. 
As'ad, a leftist figure associated in the past with the Popular Front, was now in 
charge of co-ordinating the work of refugee committee in camps, and liaising 
between the PNA and the refugee leadership. When the national conference did 
take place in September (in Gaza) it ushered the co-optation of this oppositional 
movement under the aegis of the PLO. The political agenda of the popular 
committees was institutionalised and they were transformed into pressure 





























































































On the eve of the convening of committees for final status negotiations 
on the future of refugee between Israel and the Palestinians (late 1999) the 
popular committees in the camps remain - despite their institutionalisation - 
major sources of popular mobilisation. Some - like deputy Marwan Barghouti 
from Fateh - believe that it is foolhardy to reach an agreement on refugees that 
does not ensure the right of return in one form or another, and believe that an 
interim agreement that will improve the daily lives of refugees is better than a 
final agreement that abandons their historical claims44. In the event the authority 
reaches an agreement that is short of ensuring these minimal rights it is most 
likely that the committees will be activated to protest such an agreement. But 
they are also a two-edged sword, since they may also be mobilised by the 
authority to ensure support for an agreement that is likely to be opposed by the 
radical opposition. At this juncture one can only say that no final status 
agreement will be stable if it does not address the legitimate claims of the 
refugees, and that alternatively, the lack of solution for the refugee issues will 
remain a source of instability undermining the legitimacy of the Palestinian 
authority in Palestinian and the refugee camps of Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.
Case Four:
Women NGOs and the Campaign to Reform Personal Status Law (The 
Case of the "Women's Model Parliament")
Superficially, this case study could be seen as an example of positive 
cooperation between women's organizations and the Palestinian Authority 
working in alliance to change highly oppressive and discriminatory family 
legislation and working together to confront the social and ideological 
domination of the Islamic fundamentalist movement. This positive view, 
however, does not take into account the more problematic aspects of the 
political environment in which the women's movement- PNA "alliance" took 
place. The case is exemplary of the extent to which the majority of pro­
democracy and reform Palestinian cso's during the "post-Oslo transition" are in 
fact caught in a dilemma — that of being trapped between a highly authoritarian 
and undemocratic government structure and its main and most powerful 
opposition — the Islamist movement. The case ultimately shows the limitations 
of Palestinian cso's organizing for progressive social and political change in 
this context while only having an extremely limited popular mandate.
In the case of the "Women's model parliament" -- the outcome was that 
the women's movement was unable to be bring forth real social change because 
its allies (secular political groups) were both politically weak and ambivalent




























































































about the implications of gender equality.45 This weakness, led the women’s 
movement into a situation of being patronized by the government (the 
Palestinian Authority) which accomplished to "manage” the conflict. Its prime 
concern was not to let the Islamists gain more ground in the society by making 
the Authority seem to be in collusion with the women's movement. At the same 
time the PA, saw that suppressing the parliament would only lead to a greater 
alienation among the mainstay of its largely secular supporters. In this highly 
contested political field in which the women's movement was largely powerless, 
the actual goals of the campaign — the reform of legislation — was completely 
frozen.
At the same time, the campaign very importantly opened up a vociferous 
public debate about fundamental aspects of citizens rights and the role of law in 
society. This crucial debate had been largely absent in the post-Oslo transition 
in which there has been a growing clamp-down on rights of free speech, the 
press and human rights organizations and where existent political parties have 
failed to develop the necessary structures and visions that would make them a 
viable political alternative to the state and the Islamists. The fact that social 
issues are viewed by the government as relatively "benign" allowed an opening 
for this discussion to begin. However, once it developed into a full-fledged 
clash of political and ideological wills — the PNA stepped-in as both protector 
of women's organizations and as arbitrator between different sectors of civil 
society. The result being that, the authoritarian role and nature of the 
government was not challenged but strengthened as it simply absorbed and 
subdued the public debate.
Background: The Women's movement and the Post-Oslo Era
Since the declaration of the Oslo Accords in late 1993, Palestinian women 
rights cso's have organized a variety of initiatives and activities aimed at 
reforming existing civil, criminal and Shari'a legislation from within a gender 
equality perspective. Women's rights cso's have seen the transitional period with 
its creation of a Palestinian governing body and legislature (the Palestine 
National Authority and the Legislative Council) as a crucial opportunity to 
impact the development of government policy and legislation while these are 
still in formation. Based on a longstanding history of women’s contribution to 
and integration in the struggle for national liberation, the women's movement 
has a relatively high amount of popular legitimacy in Palestine in comparison to 
other Middle Eastern and Islamic contexts. In addition, the Palestinian women's 
movement made up of a broad coalition of women from political parties,
45 This case study is based on an article co-written by the author with Penny Johnson. The 




























































































factionally-based women's "committees", Charitable Association members, PLO 
women's Unions, and the slew of more recently emerged women NGO's has 
been perhaps the most active and mobilized social movement during the 
transitional period. Its strength is due to a number of factors: the pluralistic 
nature of its constituent parts, the autonomy acquired from political parties 
during the early 1990s which allowed many women's activists and organizations 
formerly associated with parties to survive the political crisis the parties have 
been undergoing; the availability and ability to exploit donor money for gender 
issues; and finally a clear articulated and shared agenda for women's equality. 
At the same time, the professionalization of many women's rights cso's has led 
to a de-linking of it from its former popular base. As such, although the 
movement enjoys a wide support among women in different sectors of society — 
it no longer has an on-going organizational system in which to link with or 
mobilize them.
Background on Legislative Reform:
The tangled and contradictory nature of the legal situation in Palestine is 
another legacy of the various foreign powers that have ruled or occupied the 
remaining areas of historic Palestine (the West Bank and Gaza Strip) since 
1948. Original Ottoman legislation in place in Palestine in 1922 was overlain 
with an array of Emergency Regulations (Military laws) by the British Mandate 
authorities who ruled the country until 1948. Following this period, Gaza came 
under Egyptian rule which reformed some sectors of law in line with those 
existent in Egypt while also expanding the jurisdiction of military laws. The 
West Bank, which was annexed by Jordan was brought under the Jordanian 
legal system. Following 1967, Israel left the existing civil and Shari'a systems in 
place in the two areas but massively expanded the use of military regulations — 
which became the cornerstone of their strategy to colonize the land and 
expropriate the natural resources of the occupied territories. Under Israel rule, 
the regular criminal and civil court system went into near-collapse. Most 
Judges and public prosecutors from the pre-67 period remained on strike 
throughout the period of the occupation, while those who took their place were 
viewed as untrustworthy due to being appointed by the military government. 
Court buildings, files and registration systems were in a state of chaos — and 
the population turned to versions of the indigenous system of customary law to 
deal with their internal legal disputes.
Akin to many other Middle Eastern contexts, only personal status law in 
Palestine remains under ecclesiastical courts up to the present. As such, 
marriage, divorce, inheritance and most areas dealing with men and women in 




























































































courts for the Christian minority, and Islamic Shari'a courts for the Muslim 
majority). While both Egyptian and Jordanian authorities made adjustments to 
Shari'a in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (in line with changes there) — the 
Israeli authorities generally did not intercede in the working of the courts. As 
such, the Shari'a courts are one of the few areas of the legal system that was 
utilized by the population under occupation. However, the courts were seen as 
extremely conservative in their judgements and very lax in their application of 
the law when it would favor women.
The Palestinian Authority stepped into this context of the deeply de- 
developed nature of the legal system as a whole but has largely been seen as 
making it worse rather than better. To date, the Executive Authority has refused 
to pass the principle piece of legislation mandated to it under the Oslo Accords - 
- the Basic Law. The draft Basic Law was passed by the democratically elected 
Legislative Council after its fourth reading but the President of the National 
Authority has refused to sign it into law. Similarly, the Legislative Council has 
reviewed and passed a variety of legislation only to have the final passage of the 
majority of them blocked by the President. The Authority continues to by-pass 
the existing legal system and is viewed as consistently attempting to thwart its 
re-organization and development. Instead, it has developed its own "military 
courts" and various actions and policies by the intelligence and military 
infrastructure suggests that it prefers "political arbitration" to the rule of law. 
One outcome of this is that issues such as human rights, legislative development 
and reform or unifying the legal system have largely fallen to cso's to deal 
with. In May 1999, a report by the United Nations Special Coordinators Office 
on international donor contributions towards the development of rule of law in 
the West Bank and Gaza caused a public outcry. An analysis of the report 
suggested that of the more $100 million (US) given or pledged by donors to the 
law and human rights sectors since 1994 — only $3 million had gone to the 
Ministry of Justice while the rest had gone to NGOs.
The Model parliament:
Despite this the virtual paralysis of legislative activity in the Palestinian 
Legislative Council, the women’s movement's most visible activity since Oslo 
was a shadow or model parliament that in fact passed a wide range of suggested 
amendments to existing law, after a series of activities reviewing a wide range 
of legislation in areas of criminal, civil and personal status law.
The model parliament was a culmination of a series of related activities which 
began in 1994. A major conference on Women, Justice and the Law 
(coordinated by the Palestinian human rights organization A1 Haq) in 




























































































in 1995, and a series of regional and national activities in 1996 and 1997 
culminating in the elected model parliament (coordinated by the Women’s 
Center for Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) and a steering committee of 
women's organizations.
The activities of the model parliament were initially conceived of as an 
“exercise,” where arguments for women’s rights and legal reform could be 
tested and refined in a participatory and public manner. As such various 
regional groups (composed of a broad spectrum of community activists and 
leaders — not only the cadre and supporters of the women's movement) 
reviewed existing legislation in three main areas of law; criminal, civil and 
personal status law. Regional groups were supposed to develop basic principles 
on which specific laws should be reformed and then in the final "parliament" 
these principles would put into effect and the specifics of language would be 
voted upon. Thus, in a series of regional workshops, women and men 
considered labor, social welfare and education, criminal and public law, among 
others, and effectively used the principle of equality to discover gender 
inequities that should be addressed, as well as recommending special provisions 
for women's rights in such issues as maternity leave and violence against 
women. The stated aim was, "to pass Palestinian legislation that ensures 
equality and women's human rights for Palestinian women, as well as their 
participation in building a civil society based on justice, equality, respect for 
human rights and mle of law".
In general, regional groups working on issues of labor law, criminal law 
and civil law were able to easily reach consensus over changes in line with the 
principle of equality. Applying the principle of equality in personal status laws, 
however, was much more difficult for participants in these fora, given that the 
Shari'a has a legally—defined model of family and gender relations based on 
complementarily between male and female roles, rather than equality. Rights 
and obligations are seen as equivalent, rather than equal: the husband’s 
responsibility for “maintenance” of his wife is exchanged for female 
“obedience” in the exercise of her marital and child raising duties in the home. 
More problematical, Shari'a law in the Palestinian context, as elsewhere in the 
Middle East has become seen among many social groups as "the preferential 
symbol" for Islamic identity (Helie-Lucas 1994, 391). As such it is an extremely 
charged political symbol.
Within the various regional groups, contesting approaches to Shari'a 
quickly emerged. Where religious or socially conservative groups had no 
difficulty in applying the principle of equality to other areas of law, the 




























































































personal status. Several different approaches emerged to the question of reform 
of existing personal status law. A number of women activists consistently 
advocated applying the principles of gender equality in the Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence and United Nations resolutions and pushed for a 
civil family law applied in civil courts. They additionally invoked the PLO's 
signing of the 1979 CEDAW as a legal justification for this position (Othman 
1989, 67). A second trend responded with an almost blanket endorsement of 
Shari'a without further interpretation and reform, except by religious authorities. 
Their claim was that Shari'a is basically "God's Law", is not open to human 
intervention and in any case its spirit is based on principles of Islamic justice 
and equality (Othman 1998, 66). A third position essentially compromised 
between the two, by advocating reform within Shari'a law and affirming that 
Islamic law is responsive to change that reflects the needs of contemporary 
women and society. They argued that Shari'a legislation in every Arab country 
is the product of interpretation by various schools of Islamic jurisprudence and 
that current Palestinian legislation was not only woefully out of date with 
current social and economic life, but was imposed on Palestinians by various 
foreign powers(Othman 1998, 66-67).
The debate however, tapped into a set of deeper issues about Palestinian 
nationalism, political culture and identity. First of all it raised questions about 
the right of individuals (especially secular ones) outside the religious hierarchy 
to debate fundamental aspects of religion and law. This arose through the attack 
by Islamists (as well as religious jurists) who framed their arguments around the 
illegitimacy of the parliament and its members to even discuss Shari'a. The 
"right" to debate was made even more critical by the fact that, an attack on the 
regional workshop in the northern city of Nablus posed the illegitimacy with 
reference to the fact that the speaker presenting the case for unified civil law to 
replace Shari'a was a Christian. The attempt to exclude Christian Palestinians 
from having a say on the issue deeply contradicted the nationalist consensus — 
which has always prided itself on bridging the Muslim Christian divide in the 
community. The right to speak, although becoming the focus of the extended 
public debate about the parliament, was in some ways secondary to a more 
critical issue which confronted the women's movement itself. This was over 
what to do with Shari’a legislation as existed — reform it within existing 
parameters, push for a unified civil family law and courts in line with the 
equality argument; or a compromise proposal akin to what had evolved in the 
1994 al Haq workshops — a parallel system of civil and religious courts which 
individuals could choose between. This debate was a West Bank based one, 
given that the workshops in Gaza (whose sole focus was on personal status law) 
had from the outset decided on the internal reform framework and had 




























































































The Islamist attack on the model parliament was also West Bank-based 
reflecting internal divisions within the Islamic movement as well as, the 
different approaches taken by the women's movement in the two dis-connected 
regions of PNA rule. The Islamists mounted a well -organized campaign whose 
aim was to de-legitimate the women's movement in order to thwart the nascent 
debate on reform of Shari'a. The larger political goal of the attack was to 
mobilize popular support for the Islamists through positing themselves as 
protectors of the nation's social and moral values. This should be understood in 
a context of declining political support among the population at large for the 
movement.
The movement's campaign began with the wide-spread distribution of a 
pamphlet entitled "The Arab Woman and the Conspiracy of the Secular 
Women". The booklet defames the women's movement as tools of Western 
conspiracies whose goal is to destroy the Islamic family and Palestinian social 
and religious values. The booklet sketches out the various ways in which 
reforms of Shari'a suggested by the model parliament would lead to the moral 
breakdown of society. Soon Imam's associated with the movement took up the 
call and preached against the model parliamentarians in Friday sermons. At 
Universities and other venues, the Islamists organized rallies in which "spokes- 
shaykhs" of the movement offered doomsday scenarios of the implications of 
the parliamentarians' recommendations. Various women's movement activists 
attempted to speak at these rallies but largely found that their pleas for calm 
reason and logic were buried under the populist rhetoric of the shaykhs to their 
followers. Overwhelmingly, the tone of the attack was political and aimed at 
popular consciousness about morality. Religious argument, or jurisprudence 
was not involved in the Islamist discourse (although within the parliament it 
was invoked by local Islamic jurists).
Instead, their focus remained a political attack on the parties behind the 
idea of legislative reform and essentially never addressed the very real problems 
of the current legislation that exists — problems that are perceived by the society 
at large and not simply, the women's movement. Instructive in this regard, is the 
fact that divisions between the male leadership of HAMAS and some of their 
younger female constituency (a number of whom were participants in the 
parliament workshops) began to emerge.46 Maysun al Rahmeh, from the
46. In a conference held by the Islamic Block in Ramallah on March 13 entitled" The Women's 
technical Committee and the Conspiracy Against Palestinian Women" in which they were able 
to round up 300 public schoolteachers, clear signs of an emerging split between Islamist 
women who supported elements of the parliaments recommendations and the extremely 





























































































HAMAS associated, A1 -Khanisa Society for Women, made the clear statement 
in the local papers that she was not in principle againts the parliament, but felt 
that she and other Islamist women were excluded from it — or in her own case, 
were only included near the end and as an after-thought.47
However, the formal religious hierarchy were not supportive of the attack 
— but seemd more concerned that they were not being consulted. The head of 
the Shari'a high court of appeals in the West Bank, Shaykh Hamad Bitawi (who 
participated in the last parliament session in the West bank)in a series of public 
statements made clear that,"...in the shari'a courts, we are for women's rights, if 
what is meant are their rights given to them in Islam...the problem is that some 
groups have started to incite against the personal status law..".48 He and the 
Mufti of Jerusalem (Akrama Sabri) both publicly supported the change and 
reform of current Shari'a legislation, but emphasized it should be undertaken by 
specialists,"Shari'a judges, muftis and professors of Shari'a in the Palestinian 
Colleges".
Because the model parliament became the focus of such a public attack — 
the PNA and political parties who had barely noticed it, were forced to react. A 
leading Democratic Front (FIDA) legislative council member was one of the 
first to come out, publicly against the Islamist campaign and in defense of the 
parliament. In one of the main local newspapers he charged that the attack on 
the parliament was an attack on free speech and freedom of thought. He also 
explicitly suggested that the attack was an organized political campaign by "the 
Muslim Brotherhood" who had felt themselves marginalized over the past 
period, and who tried to frighten the populace back into their arms. The 
Palestinian Authority, then intervened and in a rather uncomfortable situation 
the final session held in the West Bank town of Ramallah, had to wait until the 
PA military governor of the region arrived to open the session with a speech 
containing a message from President Yasser Arafat. Here the right to freedom of 
thought and expression was invoked, by the governor, at the same time that it 
was made clear albeit (in ambiguous terms) that the president supported 
legislative reform and women’s rights..."as long as they do not contradict 
Shari'a".
As the final national session moved to Gaza, the parliament assumed 
more and more the stature of a nationalist (rather than simply "women's") event. 
The proceedings began with solidarity speeches given by representatives of 
every political faction (including Islamic Jihad) and only excluding HAMAS. 
Almost every speaker included in their speech, an affirmation of the important
47
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role of Palestinian women in the national struggle and an affirmation of the 
right to free speech as being part of the national consensus. Typically, women’s 
rights were linked to the modernist and nationalist project of state building. 
When it came to the issue of Shari’a, there was also consensus that it should be 
reformed — and again, nationalism was invoked as a justification for its reform. 
The laws on the books (including Shari'a) were repeatedly described as 
"foreign" and the creation of various occupying governments — changing the 
laws was invoked as part of what states do -  i.e. by changing the laws, 
Palestine and its institutions would be coming closer to statehood.
However, in terms of the specifics of legal reform most of the political 
leaders in their speeches were quite conservative in their focus and 
recommendations. A leading member of Fateh in the PNA focussed on women's 
lack of inheritance and linked it to "backward" practices such as intermarriage - 
- clearly suggesting that the problem was not the laws but their lack of 
implementation. The Communists Party speaker said it was necessary to 
"control" polygamy and that the Parliament should not allow divorce to become 
rampant. The Islamic Jihad speaker affirmed that Islam is no obstacle in the 
way of women and then excused himself from not making any specific 
suggestions around the law because he had not seen the documents.
Despite the reticence in the speeches by representatives of the nationalist 
factions, the final session of the model parliament did go on to pass a number of 
quite radical recommendations in terms of legislative reform. At the same time, 
the recommendations themselves had no political weight or legal standing. They 
did not represent the outcome of a democratically elected body charged with the 
purpose of legislative reform. Nor did the parliament represent a political 
movement with political weight that would be able to effect change through the 
political system. The participatory process that the women's movement used to 
try and get various sectors of society represented willy-nilly in the model 
sessions was no substitute for either. The main model parliament organizers 
(The Women's Center for Legal Aid and Counseling) has decided that the next 
phase of the campaign is to lobby individual members of the democratically 
elected (but largely powerless) Palestinian Legislative Council to work towards 
enacting gender-equitable legal reform. The organizers say that they are now 
going "all-out" for civil law but will not do another public campaign given the 
political spotlight they found themselves in with model parliament. As such, 
they are not taking the main recommendations of the model parliament to the 
legislative council — and have narrowed participation as opposed to opening it 
up. At the same time, President Yasser Arafat has appointed three different 
committees of religious clerics to propose changes to existent Shari'a law — 




























































































committees. The women's movement's repeated requests to have their own 
representatives on these committees have been refused.
Case 5
The PNA versus Hamas; the Situation of Dual Power in a Context of State 
Building without Sovereignity
This case study reviews and analyzes the ongoing political conflict between the 
Palestine National Authority (PNA) and its main opposition, the islamist 
movement HAMAS during various stages of the state formation process. It 
raises a number of issues of importance to understanding conflicts between state 
and civil society in an incomplete post-liberation situation. At various times, the 
nascent government has been under enormous pressure to actively suppress 
sectors of civil society at the behest of powerful external players (in this case 
Israel and the United States). One of the crucial components of the negotiated 
agreement between the PLO and Israel, was that the former would not only 
forego armed struggle against continued Israeli hegemony, but would also 
suppress political groups in Palestinian society who continued an armed 
struggle against the occupier. Foremost amongst these was the Islamic 
Resistance Movement (HAMAS).
HAMAS is an important case which challenges our understandings of 
civil organizations. In its strategies and structure it mimics the classic form of 
many leftist liberation movements. That is to say it has had both a state- 
building/service delivery component, as well as an armed wing. It initially arose 
as a quietist movement — and built a base of support through the provision of a 
wide-array of civil society organizations (educational, charitable, and service 
oriented). Its armed wing developed much later — in 1988 following the 
outbreak of the mass uprising (Intifada) when it was perceived that the 
movement was losing its constituency to the nationalist struggle against the 
occupation dominated by secular PLO-affiliated factions. At various times, one 
or the other component of the movement (the militarist versus the service- 
oriented) has been more dominant in terms of it mobilizing support from the 
population and there have also been conflicts and contradictions between the 
two.
Since Oslo the PNA's main strategy for dealing with HAMAS has been to 
attempt to co-opt it into the ruling authority — despite the ongoing demands by 
Israel and the U.S. that the PNA simply use brute force to cmsh it. This is 
because the PNA sees that the movement has a large and popular constituency - 
- a constituency that was largely built through its service and educational 




























































































suppressing HAMAS has put the very existence of the PNA at risk -- as its 
creation and sustainability is profoundly dependent on Israel acquiescence and 
U.S. support.
Periodization of the Conflict Between HAMAS and the PNA:
Phase 1: May - November 1994 Period of Dual Power in Gaza
Polls throughout the early 1990s, showed that HAMAS garnered a high level of 
popular support with approximately 35% of the population supporting HAMAS 
over secular political factions and political independents. The strength of 
support in Gaza for HAMAS was higher — since Gaza was the movements 
home-ground. Moreover, in Gaza in the later stages of the Intifada HAMAS had 
come to dominate the politics and cultural life of the population at the level of 
the everyday.
The Oslo Accords called for a phased withdrawal of the Israeli military 
and ruling bureaucracy from Palestinian population areas, with the first areas 
that withdrawal would take place being Gaza and Jericho. Simultaneous with 
this would be a hand-over to Palestinian police (the majority of them made up 
of PLO military forces who would be brought in from various exile contexts). 
This first withdrawal and hand-over took place in May 1994. Palestine police 
took over all Israeli military installations, as well as the civil bureaucracy within 
a few short days in Gaza. At the same time, the political leadership of the PLO 
remained outside until July 1994 — meaning that a full political transition was 
incomplete. This period and even prior to it when the IDF knew they would be 
withdrawing was one of relative anarchy — with a growth in militarization of 
the population, as well as various vigilante-style groups based in political 
factions trying to assert their strength and power prior to the coming of the 
political leadership. HAMAS, was the movement most vociferous in rejecting 
the Oslo Accords and continued not only to try and rule the streets but 
continued to engage in armed military attacks against Israeli installations in 
Gaza — which had remained to protect Israeli settlements.
With the coming of the political leadership to Gaza in July 1994 the 
conflict between HAMAS and the PNA became even more critical. HAMAS's 
leadership at various public rallies refused to recognize the legitimacy of the 
PNA, military operations both within Gaza and in the West Bank seemed 
designed to specifically embarrass the PNA and show its lack of power and 
authority. Israel also showed the weakness of the PNA by undertaking the 




























































































nose of the PA — suggesting also that the nascent authority had no power (and 
no right under Oslo) to stop Israeli incursions into the self-rule areas.
To this point in time, the PNA felt itself too weak to openly confront 
HAMAS. Instead, it tried to use the usual mechanisms of patronage to co-opt 
them — most specifically HAMAS was offered a number of seats on the PLO 
executive — a strategy that failed when the HAMAS leadership demanded 40% 
of the total seats available. At the funeral in Gaza of Hani Abed, the PNA 
chairman (Yasser Arafat) came to pay his condolences and was publicly booed 
and humiliated. An internal debate within the PNA took place during this period 
with military officials who had come from exile pushing for a military crack­
down on HAMAS, while the political leadership from within Gaza knowingly 
calling for caution and continued negotiations.
Phase II: Military Repression Versus Political Repression (November 1994 to 
February 1996)
The next phase of the confrontation between the PNA and HAMAS was the 
period when there was an attempt by the PNA to make a split between the 
military wing of HAMAS on the one hand and its political wing and civil 
society infrastructure on the other. The specific event that represented this 
change in strategy took place on November 18th 1994, when the Palestine 
Authority police opened fire on a rally of Islamist worshippers outside Palestine 
mosque in Gaza — killing 14 of them and wounding another 250 — a worse 
number of fatalities in one day than had ever taken place under Israeli 
occupation. This confrontation, set the stage for an increasingly authoritarian 
regime willing to wield violence against political forces that might threaten its 
hegemony. In addition to the growing conflict outlined in period 1 above, the 
background to this incident also included an explicit threat by then Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin in early November 1994 that he would re-enter Gaza 
and crush HAMAS militarily if the PNA didn't. Rabin's threat if carried out 
would clearly result in the end of the PNA and the Peace Process.
The rally at the Palestine Mosque had been organized by HAMAS in 
defiance of a ban imposed by Chairman Yasser Arafat on the holding of a 
public funeral for an islamist suicide bomber who had attempted to carry out an 
operation on an Israeli settlement in Gaza in early November 1994. More than 
2,000 worshippers rallied at Palestine mosque in defiance of the ban — and it 
was alleged that a number of them were armed. The rally posed a frontal 
challenge to the authority of the PNA as a government with the legitimacy and 
power to impose public order and its political will. As the worshippers came out 





























































































probably trigger happy due to the ongoing sense of powefles: 
humiliation they had been feeling both vis a vis HAMAS as v%l 
Following angry verbal confrontations — the police began to open f&fy 
fatal results already mentioned. It seems clear that there was not an e: 
order to fire but that the situation spiraled out of control. The incident clearly 
brought home to the head of the PNA — that the Police — largely from his Fateh 
movement had been wanting a military confrontation with HAMAS and that he 
might be losing control over them if he did not support their action. In the 
immediate aftermath of the massacre, Arafat confined the police to barracks and 
set up a series of mediating committees in an attempt to resolve the conflict with 
HAMAS politically. However, the next day the streets of Gaza were witness to 
the first ever military parade held by the PNA followed by a major Fateh/PNA 
political rally — in a huge show of strength.
As mentioned, the massacre and its aftermath represented a major turning 
point — in how the nascent governing authority chose to deal with its main 
opposition. As challenges to its legitimacy turned into perceived challenges to 
its very survival given the extremely constrained parameters (both political and 
geographic) of the peace process it weighed in on the side of militarily crashing 
HAMAS into political submission. This tactic clearly worked for a period — the 
HAMAS political leadership began to face the reality that in a military 
confrontation they would lose to Fateh. Thus, the following period was one of a 
relative political "cease-fire" between the two sides.
The basic contours of this "cease-fire" was that any military actions by 
HAMAS within PNA territory would be met with mass arrests. In September 
1995, an agreement was worked out by the PNA and the HAMAS political 
leadership that the former would use all its influence to stop Israeli pursuit of 
wanted Islamist activists in PNA territory. In return, the political leadership of 
HAMAS would try to stop any actions that might de-rail the peace process — or 
that would put the PNA in a vulnerable position vis a vis Israel and the United 
States. Throughout the period between September 1995 until February 1996, the 
agreement actually worked. What then led to its unraveling was ironically the 
assassination of Israeli premiere Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995.
Phase III: The End of Political Cease-fire; Islamist Civil Society Organizations 
Held Hostage (January 1996-1998).
In January 1996, a bomb hidden in a cell-phone killed HAMAS bomb engineer, 
Yahya Ayyash, in the Gaza refugee camp of Jabaliya. Although wanted by 
Israel for being the technician behind a number of suicide attacks on Israeli 































































































cease-fire agreement with HAMAS. The Israeli security establishment 
understood, that as long as it did not assassinate HAMAS activists, the HAMAS 
political leadership could prevail on the military wing not to undertake 
vengeance attacks. What led to the changed Israeli policy was the assassination 
of Yitzhak Rabin. The Israeli Shin Bet (internal security apparatus) had come 
under severe public criticism for failing to properly protect the prime minister. 
The assassination of Ayyash was an attempt by the Shin Bet to publicly 
rehabilitate their battered image among the Israeli public.
Ayyash's funeral was attended by more than 100,000 people in Gaza — 
suggesting not so much actual support for his role, but immense public anger at 
Israel and a chance to express the great disappointment towards what the peace 
process had become at the level of everyday life. HAMAS's military wing was 
swift to act. Between February and March 1996 four major suicide operations 
were undertaken against Israeli civilians within Israel — resulting in enormous 
carnage. This put the PNA under immense pressure by Israel and the United 
States. Until this point, the PNA had been able to persuade them that co­
optation of HAMAS rather than the use of brute force was the best strategy to 
domesticate the movement. After the series of bus bombings, however, Israeli 
public opinion towards the peace process became the sole priority for Israel and 
the United States. Thus, the PNA was under immense pressure to finally move 
to "crush" HAMAS — and specifically its military wing. Given the underground 
nature of the military wing, as well as the tenuous links between it and the 
above-ground leadership— this was no easy task.
Here it is important to mention that until this point, the PNA had in its 
various conflicts with HAMAS, never moved against the movement's social 
service infrastructure. As mentioned earlier, HAMAS and its affiliated 
organizations had a large and sophisticated social service, charitable and 
educational infrastructure — especially in Gaza. These civil society 
organizations run by the movement included a university, a network of clinics, 
an array of charitable organizations, tithes committees, daycare centers, football 
clubs, schools, two human rights organizations, a newspaper and very 
importantly a huge network of mosques through which movement delivered its 
message and many of its services. After March 1996 — the PNA no longer left 
this infrastructure out of its campaign. The University was raided, 20 
organizations were closed, and the newspaper was shut-down. More 
threateningly for HAMAS's political leadership — the PNA undertook a series 
of take overs of their institutions. As many as 459 mosques in Gaza were taken 
under the auspices of the PNA - and this was followed by a steady campaign of 
undermining, HAMAS football clubs so that youth would join Fateh sponsored 




























































































crackdown on HAMAS activists — with more than 1,200 activists, former 
activists and family members rounded up and imprisoned within an eight week 
period immediately following March 1996. The wide-spread use of torture 
during this period (in two cases resulting in death) has been well-documented 
by both local and international human rights groups.
What is clear, especially given the quiescence of HAMAS following this 
period, is that the use of the islamist civil society organizations as a bargaining 
chip was able to finally bring the political leadership of HAMAS, and thus the 
movement as a whole under the government’s hegemony. Although most of the 
armed cells of HAMAS have been destroyed by the PNA and Israel over the 
past two years -  what is perhaps of more significance is the fact that the main 
political leadership has come to distance itself politically from armed actions. 
Holding the civil society institutions of the movement hostage seems to have 
been the main strategy that was able to achieve this outcome.49
Case Six
Governance and Control of Urban Space in Jerusalem
1. An Atomized City
A significant feature of Jerusalem is its segmented, communal character. 
Jerusalem, unlike Hebron and Nablus, has no urban centre. Its old 
neighbourhoods continue to display a confessional, ’closed’ character. Only in 
the outer areas of Sheikh Jarrah, Shu’fat, and Beit Hanina do we see a pattern of 
bourgeois modernity that emerged in the 1950s. These patterns were preceded 
by the emergence of new middle class neighbourhoods in Baq’a, Katamon, and 
Talbieh—West of the old city—in thel930 s, but were soon destroyed in the war 
of 48, and their inhabitants exiled to the Eastern part and the rest of the 
diaspora.
There is a substantial degree of communalism, one is tempted to say 
ghettoization, also in the Jewish part of the city—particularly among the haredei 
and ultra orthodox communities, in Mia She’arim, the Bukharan Quarter, 
etc...where urban consciousness is subordinated to an internal religious 
normative ethos. In the rest of the Jewish city however, both in workingclass 
Sephardic communities, as well as in Europeanized ashkinazi quarters we 
witness an urban culture which resonates with issues common to European 
cities: tenancy and property battles, campaigns for the fate of local taxes, the
49 The author would like to thank Graham Usher for information as well as insights that were 




























































































citizen as a consumer, neighbourhood struggles which are integrated into 
national politics, and so on.
This is not the case in Arab Jerusalem. In the old city the neighbourhoods are 
isolated and confessional in character. There is widespread desertion of the 
middle and professional strata to the suburbs. While the Muslim, Christian and 
Armenian quarters are becoming pauperized, the Jewish quarter—by virtue of 
its expansion and reconstruction—was transformed into a millionaires ghetto. 
Outside the old city the adjacent communities are also segmented, and exhibit a 
high degree of localized consciousness. Rural communities, such as Silwan, 
Tur, and Izariyyeh, have become fully urbanized, but without urban 
consciousness. Like Shufat, Beit Hanina, and Ras al Umud they are virtual 
dormitory communities, where people commute to work elsewhere. All of these 
communities outside the old city have two social features in common:
• they have no centre around which communal life can be organized, 
which enhances the role of family dwellings and local clubs as social nodes 
for gathering and visitation.
• they are completely lacking in an internal economy which typifies 
traditional urban communities (crafts, or food processing), as well as in 
substantial shopping centres which feature in modem urban developments. 
In effect they are local 'grocery store’ communities.
Politically Jerusalem lost its hegemonic political elite, the class of notables, 
which in the Mandate constituted a national elite. The war of 48 ,migration, and 
the loss of the trade networks with the coastal region all contributed to the 
demise of this class. During the fifties and sixties the remnants of this 
elites(members of the Nashashibi, Nusseibi, and Khatib clans) were 
incorporated into the Jordanian governing class. Others maintained powerful 
positions in the Awqaf administration—now shared with Hebron families.
With Israeli occupation (1967 to the present) these elites were reduced to 
merchant families that continue to maintain family property and interests, but 
they no longer constitute a component of a national elite, which was completely 
submerged by the emergence of the PLO. The fusion of the PLO bureaucracy 
into the West Bank and Gaza locale elites after 1994 did little to revive the 
demise of these notables. What replaced them was not a new rising strata of 
professionals, party aparatchiks, and returnees—as we witnessed in Gaza, 
Nablus and Hebron—but the gradual atomization of power. The results of the 
legislative elections of 1996 to the national assembly were illustrative. The 




























































































outskirts, or outsiders. Very few members of the old notable families contested 
the elections. Those who did, lost.
2. Features of Exclusion
The disempowerment and disenfranchisement of the Palestinian population of 
Jerusalem was achieved through a series of exclusivist policies. The extension 
of Israeli services and social benefits of the welfare state (National Insurance 
and health benefits) was the compensatory price for disenfranchisement.
The process of exclusion and subordination was executed through four 
mechanisms: (a) annexation, (b) zoning regulations, (c) residency and access 
restrictions, and (d) demographic control.
The extension of Israeli law (“Jerusalem Law”) in 1968 and 1981 the 
area(s) of East Jerusalem ended the status of Jerusalem as a capital of the West 
Bank, and centre of the Govemorate of Jerusalem. New areas to the north, south 
and west of the city were added to the Municipal borders of the Israeli city, and 
other neighbourhoods, were excluded. The net effect was to break economic 
and demographic continuity between Jerusalem and its Arab hinterland.
No new suburbs of neighbourhood were allowed inside the municipal 
boundaries; one neighbourhhod—the Mughrabi quarter, inside the old city was 
completely demolished—while 31 Jewish neighbourhood were added since 
1967. Restrictions on Arab housing took the form of draconian municipal 
measures, which withheld permits for new or expanded construction, and 
demolished illegal building. [Amira Haas wrote recently in Haaretz that 
although both Arabs and Jews receive warnings about illegal buildings, Jewish 
violators never face actual demolition]. Since 1967 around 12% of all new 
construction took place in the Arab sector, which represents one-third of the 
total population. The annual rate of building is 2,200 apartments for Israeli 
Jews, against around 230 for Arabs (about 10 to 1). In Jewish neighbourhoods 
recent changes in the regulations allow contractors to build up to 8 stories in 
height—compared to two stories in Arab neighbourhoods. Since 1967 over 
70,000 Jewish settler families have received subsidized housing in East 
Jerusalem, while only 550 Arab families received such subsidies .
Ethnic Residency Rights and Denial o f Access
By separating the (newly constructed) boundaries of Jerusalem from the West 
Bank, access to the city was denied from Palestinians living in the greater 
Jerusalem area (as well as those in the West Bank and Gaza). Residency rights 
were restricted to those who were registered in the census of September 1967. 




























































































barred to all Palestinians, including those who were bom in the city but who 
failed to be present there when the census took place.
Since the Gulf War (1990) restrictions of entry into and transit from the 
city became, requiring special permits. New border checkpost were established 
separating the city from its Arab hinterland. These restrictions became very 
severe after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Less than 5% of the 
population (mostly workers) received such permits in the 1993-1998 period.
The effective result of this separation has been to rapture the city from its 
natural geographic environment, and to undermine the city as a market and 
service sector for West Bank Palestinians. It has also served to disconnect the 
continuity of the emerging regional conurbation connecting Jerusalem with 
Bethlehem in the South and Ramallah in the North.2 Instead a new conurbation 
emerged linking the core of the city with Jewish satellite settlements in the 
South West, North East, and North West.
The ostensible purpose for this denial of access is to protect the security 
of the Jewish population from terrorist activity that originates in the West Bank. 
However the latent, but hardly disguised objective, seems to aim at preempting 
final status negotiations over sovereignty in the city, by creating a defacto 
separation from the city and many of its Arab neighbourhoods. It has also 
encouraged the evolution of Ramallah and Bethlehem as surrogate capitals for 
the Palestine Authority.
Demographic Encirclement
A hypothetical figure of 29:71% has been suggested as determining the higher 
ceiling for Arab demographic growth in the Jerusalem municipal area. In order 
to maintain Jewish demographic hegemony a number of incentives cater 
primarily for incoming Jewish residents (many of them in conjunction with 
religious institutions—like Ateret Cohanim—which target Jewish settlement in 
Arab neighbourhoods: housing loans, employment or study opportunities, and 
security in residence. Unlike most Palestinian residents of the city, Jewish 
residents, by virtue of being Israelis, can move in and out of the city without 
losing their residence rights. An Arab resident is faced with the threat of 
becoming an absentee if he/she moves temporarily abroad or, indeed, even for 
few kilometers outside the boundaries of the municipality. b Since many 
Jerasalimets have been compelled to re-locate to the suburbs as a result of the 





























































































This combination of demographic-political planning, combined with an 
ethnic definition of citizenship ,lhas had a critical effect on long-term 
devolution of Palestinian relationship to their city. In particular it has restricted 
population growth population through internal migration to the city, and 
encouraged existing residence to relocate outside the city. Occasionally this 
policy has boomiranged—during the years 1996-1997 net positive relocation by 
Palestinian ID holders from the suburban communities to the city was recorded 
in response to the threat of losing their IDs. For the first time in over a decade 
the number of Arabs superseded that of Jews in the Eastern part of the city. But 
it is difficult to draw a long term trend from this .
3. Jerusalem is No Longer an Arab Metropole
The general impact of these policy decisions on the part of Israelis that 
Jerusalem has lost its status as a metropolitan centre for the Palestinian 
population of the central West Bank.
Before and after Israeli occupation of 1967 , up to the mid 1980s, 
Jerusalem was the major urban centre for the West Bank as a whole and served 
as a combination of market town, a centre for banking and credit, an 
employment centre, a religious centre, a service centre, as well as an 
educational and cultural magnet for the country as a whole. Jerusalem contained 
the major specialized and general hospitals, the major shopping centres, 
educational and research centres, and religious services for both Muslims and 
Christians of all denominations.
Religion provides a major economic services for both Arabs and Israelis: 
Welfare endowments; pilgrimage networks; hotels, restaurants, and tourist 
industries; and many ancillary services that serve religious visitors to the city. 
By restricting access to the city Israel contributed effectively to the 
strangulation of these social networks and the economy that sustained them. 
Furthermore North/South trade routes linking the regional economies of Hebron 
and Bethlehem to that of Ramallah and Nablus have been severely disrupted by 
severing direct transportation arteries that go through the city 
without creating alternative by-passes 1.
Since the mid-1980s Jerusalem has ceased to be the major Palestinian 
town in economic and social terms. It has lost its service and market status to 
Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron. Its economy has been strangulated and become 
subject to West Jerusalem as a supplier of cheap labour and a minor market for 
Israeli commodities. It continues to invoke a considerable passion as a centre 




























































































Palestine, but these claims contrast radically with its reduced status as a 
provincial and encircled Arab town. At the beginning of the year 2000 (Arab) 
Jerusalem is the third city in the country in terms of its population size (after 
Gaza and Nablus), and—if present trends continue—will be overtaken by 
Hebron and Ramallah-Bireh within the next decade.
Passive Reaction to Subordination
Palestinian reaction to these measures of unilateral annexation have been 
dominated by passivity. The political bravado of Palestinian nationalist 
discourse camouflages a significant absence of a strategy of resistance. This 
passivity is due in part to the absence of a city-wide urban consciousness, 
described above, as well as to the recognition by the old Jerusalem elites, that a 
very substantial portion of the Palestinian population is of migrant origins, and 
therefore—‘does not belong’. It is also due to the successful Israeli campaign 
in coopting Arab Jerusalemites into the Israeli welfare system, and the granting 
of concrete privileges of residency (such as free mobility and access to the 
labour market( which are denied to the rest of the occupied territories .
Nevertheless Jerusalemites did respond to these forms of subordination, 
both collectively and individually. One can discern here three forms of 
responses to these impositions:
a. Non-violent resistance to the imposition of 'taxation without representation
The most successful episode of such collective action were the vigorous 
merchant strikes during the early years of the Intifada (1988-1990). 
Shopkeepers refused to pay amona (municipal property tax) as well income tax 
in unison with their compatriots in the
West Bank. This movement was crushed, as it was in the case of the tax boycott 
in Beit Sahour, by massive Israeli punitive measures. c
b. Political mobilization:
During the first decade of Israeli rule Jerusalem activists led the national 
mobilization through the network of underground political parties and 
professional syndicates based in the city. The forum which undertook this 
mobilization was the National Front and the Association of Professional 
Unions. Another vehicle for confrontation was the Higher Islamic Committee, 
also based in Jerusalem, which utilized religious sentiments and the spiritual 




























































































the leadership of these two movements shifted from Jerusalem to the other West 
Bank towns—particularly Nablus and Ramallah.
Jerusalem politics receded into dormancy until the signing of the Oslo 
Agreement, which succeeded in including Jerusalem as an electoral 
constituency for the Legislative Assembly. The election of six candidates 
(1996) from the city allowed for the integration of the city again into national 
Palestinian politics albeit in a more subdued and institutional manner. One of 
the Jerusalem deputies—Ahmad Qurai’—became the speaker of the Parliament. 
Another spur of mobilization began in 1996 as final status talks over the future 
of the city seemed impending, when two Jerusalem groups began to document 
Arab properties in West Jerusalem that belonged to refugees from the war of 
1948, in preparation to advance claims on their behalf.
c. Survival strategies:
This refers to spontaneous acts of circumvention of Israeli measures by 
‘individual cunning’ in the manner James Scott attributed to peasant responses 
to oppressive rule. The most visible feature of these responses are the 
mushrooming of illegal building activities, especially in the last decade, inside 
Jerusalem and in its outskirts, in reaction the denial of building permits, and the 
increasing congestion of limited space. Increasing demolition of non-licensed 
building did not lead to curtailing this phenomenon. 1 Within the city 
boundaries a variety of these tactics became more sophisticated and more 
difficult to combat, such as the subtle additions of new rooms for married sons 
and daughters, the addition of another floor to the house, etc...
During the years 1997/1998 many Jerusalemite Arabs who deserted the 
city began to trickle back within a variety of tenancy arrangements—mostly 
with members of their resident extended families—in reaction to the withdrawal 
of non-resident IDS by the Ministry of Interior.1
In general however the Palestinian community in Jerusalem has displayed 
a considerable degree of atomization and apathy in reaction to their fate. Short 
spurts of mass demonstrations against specific measures of Judaization (the 
Tunnel Affair, Har Homa, Silwan and Ras al Amud settlements—and most 
recently, Ateret Cohanim attempts to establish a Jewish neighbourhood in Bab 
ezZahira, inside the old city). Those were followed by ‘return to normal’ after 
dubious compromises were made with the Likud government. At the heart of 






























































































a The Wadi enNar by-pass which connects Bethlehem and the 
southern region to the North via the Jericho road is long and too 
dangerous for heavy hauling.
b Arab citizens o f Israel have the same right, but 
naturalization into Israeli citizenship is denied to former 
Jerusalmites who were born in the city, or indeed to any 
Palestinian who is not already an Israeli resident.
c For a discussion o f these activities see, Ann Latendresse, 
Jerusalem: Resistance and Urban Change, 1967-1994, Passia 
Publications, Jerusalem 1995
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